[page 170] In the Tibetan cultural region (which stretches from Kalmuck Mongolian areas near the Volga River in Europe where the Volga empties into the Caspian Sea, through Outer and Inner Mongolia, the Buriat Republic of Siberia, and through Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh, and parts of Nepal) the genre of doxography called "presentations of tenets" (*siddhāntavyavasthāpana, grub mtha'i rnam bzhag) mainly refers to delineations of the systematic schools of Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian philosophy. In this context, "philosophy" is, for the most part, related to liberative concerns—the attempt to extricate oneself and others from a round of painful existence and to attain freedom. Focal topics and issues of these schools are presented in order to stimulate metaphysical inquiry—to encourage development of an inner faculty that is capable of investigating appearances so as to penetrate their reality.

The basic perspective is that the afflictive emotions—such as desire, hatred, enmity, jealousy, and belligerence—that bind beings in a round of uncontrolled birth, aging, sickness, and death are founded on misperception of the nature of persons and other phenomena. Thus, when one penetrates the reality of things and this insight is teamed with a powerful consciousness of concentrated meditation, the underpinnings of the process of cyclic existence can be destroyed, resulting in liberation. Also, when wisdom [page 171] is further empowered through the development of love, compassion, and altruism—and by their corresponding actions—the wisdom consciousness is capable of achieving an all-knowing state in which one can effectively help a vast number of beings.

Because of this basic perspective, namely that false ideation traps beings in a round of suffering, reasoned investigation into the nature of persons and other phenomena is central to the process of spiritual development, though it is not the only concern. Systems of tenets, therefore, are primarily studied not to refute other systems but to develop an internal force that can counteract one's own innate adherence to misapprehensions. These innate forms of ignorance are part and parcel of ordinary life. They are not just learned from other systems, nor do they just arise from faulty analysis. Thus, the stated aim of studying the different schools of philosophy is to gain insight into the fact that many of the perspectives basic to ordinary life are devoid of a valid foundation. This leads the adept to then replace these with well-founded perspectives. The process is achieved through (1) first engaging in hearing great texts on such topics and getting straight the verbal presentation, (2) then thinking on their meaning to the point where the topics are ascertained with valid cognition, and (3) finally meditating on the same to the point where these realizations become enhanced by the power of concentration so that they can counteract innate tendencies to assent to false appearances.

Since it is no easy matter to penetrate the thick veil of false facades and misconceptions, it became popular in the more scholastic circles of India to investigate not just what the current tradition considered to be the best and final system but also the so-called lower systems. This provided a gradual approach to subtle topics that avoided their being confused with less subtle ones. Within such an outlook, a literary genre that compared the views of the different schools of thought developed in India and became even more systematized in Tibet. That the primary concern was indeed with developing the capacity to appreciate the profound view of a high system of philosophy is evidenced by the amount of time actually spent by students probing the workings of the so-called lower schools. Since the philosophies of those schools were appreciated, they were studied in considerable detail.[page 172]

Because of the need to get a handle on the plethora of Buddhist systems, the genre of "presentations of tenets" assumed considerable importance in Tibet. The main Indian precursors were texts such as the Tarkajvālā ("Blaze of Reasoning") by Bhāvaviveka1 (500-570 C.E.?) (Ruegg: 61) and the Tattvasaṃgrahakārikā ("Compendium of Principles") by the eighth-century scholar Śāntarakṣita with a commentary by his student Kamalaśīla (see Jha). Both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla visited Tibet in the eighth century and strongly influenced the direction that Buddhism took there.

In Tibet, the genre came to be more highly systematized, the presentations assuming a more developed structure.2 Some of these texts are long; for instance, a lengthy text entitled Theg pa mtha' dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa'i mtha' rin po che'i mdzod ("Treasury of Tenets, Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles") (GTRD) was written by the great fourteenth-century scholar Klong chen rab 'byams3 (1308-1363) of the rNying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism. Another, the Grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho ("Explanation of 'Freedom from Extremes through Understanding All Tenets': Ocean of Good Explanations") (GTKS), was authored by the great fifteenth-century scholar sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405) of the Sa skya school. The latter criticized many of the views of the founder of the dGe lugs pa school, Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357-1419), as being self-contradictory. sTag tshang's text in turn gave rise to the most extensive text of this genre in Tibet; the Grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong ("Explanation of 'Tenets,' Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings") (GTCM), also known as Grub mtha' chen mo ("Great Exposition of Tenets"),4 by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus (1648-1721), is written in large part as a refutation of sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's text is replete with citations of Indian sources but is written, despite its length, in a laconic style (unusual for him) that can leave one wondering about the relevance of certain citations. Perhaps [page 173] this was part of the reason why the eighteenth-century Mongolian scholar lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-1786)—whose reincarnation 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, then an old man, helped to find—composed a more issue-oriented text of the same genre entitled Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan ("Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets, Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching") (GTDG).5 After 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa passed away, his reincarnation, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po (1728-1791), became lCang skya's main pupil. In 1733, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po wrote an abbreviated version of these texts, entitled Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba ("Presentation of Tenets, A Precious Garland") (GTRP) (see Sopa and Hopkins, 1990).

In this sub-genre of brief presentations of tenets are earlier texts such as the Grub mtha'i rnam gzhag ("Presentation of Tenets") (GTNZ) by rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546), the Grub mtha' rgya mtshor 'jug pa'i gru rdzings ("Ship for Entering the Ocean of Tenets") (GTGD) by the second Dalai Lama dGe 'dun rgya mtsho (1476-1542), the Grub mtha'i rnam bzhag blo gsal spro ba bskyed pa'i ljon pa phas rgol brag ri 'joms pa'i tho ba ("Presentation of Tenets, Sublime Tree Inspiring Those of Clear Mind, Hammer Destroying the Stone Mountains of Opponents") (GTTB) by Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa (1478-1554), and the Grub mtha' thams cad kyi snying po bsdus pa ("Condensed Essence of All Tenets") (GTDP) by Co ne ba Grags pa bshad sgrub (1675-1748).6 A medium-length presentation of tenets that also treats the other schools of Tibetan Buddhism in a biased fashion was written by lCang-skya's biographer and student, who was also a student of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, Thu'u bkvan Blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma (1737-1802). His text is called Grub mtha' thams cad kyi khungs dang 'dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long ("Mirror of the Good Explanations Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Systems of Tenets") (GTSM).

Most likely, authors such as dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po chose to write concise texts so that the general outlines and basic postures of the systems of tenets could be taught and memorized without the encumbrance of a great deal of elaboration. Sometimes, the brevity itself makes the issues being discussed inaccessible, but, at minimum, it provides a foundation for the student, who can memorize these short texts and use them as a locus for [page 174] further elaboration. The aim clearly is to provide an easy avenue for grasping issues that revolve around the nature of persons and phenomena according to a traditional system of education.

dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po's text is exemplary of the genre. It presents the principal tenets of Indian schools, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, treating six renowned non-Buddhist schools very briefly and then focusing on the four Buddhist schools and their main sub-schools. In the order of their presentation (the list of Buddhist schools represents an ascent in order of estimation) these are:

1. NON-BUDDHIST SCHOOLS
   1. Vaiśeṣika (Bye brag pa) and Naiyāyika (Rig pa can pa) (Particularists and Logicians)
   2. Sāṃkhya (Grangs can pa) (Enumerators)
   3. Mīmāṃsā (dPyod pa ba) (Analyzers or Ritualists)
   4. Nirgrantha (gCer bu pa) (The Unclothed, better known as Jaina [rGyal ba pa])
   5. Lokāyata (rGyang 'phan pa) (Hedonists)

2. BUDDHIST SCHOOLS
   1. Hīnayāna (Lesser Vehicle)
      1. Vaibhāṣika (Bye brag smra ba) (Great Exposition School)
         1. 18 sub-schools

      2. Sautrāntika (mDo sde pa) (Sūtra School)
         1. *Āgamānusārin (Lung gi rjes 'brangs) (Following Scripture)
         2. *Nyāyānusārin (Rigs pa'i rjes 'brangs) (Following Reasoning)

   2. Mahāyanā (Great Vehicle)
      1. Cittamātra (Sems tsam pa) (Mind Only School)
         1. *Āgamānusārin (Lung gi rjes 'brangs) (Following Scripture)
         2. *Nyāyānusārin (Rigs pa'i rjes 'brangs) (Following Reasoning)

      2. Mādhyamika (dBu ma pa) (Middle Way School)
         1. Svātantrika (Rang rgyud pa) (Autonomy School)
         2. Prāsaṅgika (Thal 'gyur pa) (Consequence School)[page 175]

The division of Buddhist philosophy into four schools is itself largely an artificial creation. For instance, the so-called Vaibhāṣika school is, in fact, a collection of at least eighteen schools that never recognized themselves as belonging to a single, overarching school. Also, their tenets are so various (some prefiguring Great Vehicle schools) that it is extremely difficult to recognize tenets common to all eighteen; thus, rather than attempting to do so, the Tibetan doxographers set forth representative tenets as explained in the root text of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa ("Treasury of Manifest Knowledge") (see Shastri, Poussin) as if these constituted the general tenet structure of such an overarching system, even though they are merely typical of assertions found in these eighteen schools. This pretended amalgamation of many schools into one is a technique used to avoid unnecessary complexity that might hinder the main purpose of this genre of exegesis—the presentation of an ascent to the views of systems considered to be higher. Hence, in the Vaibhāṣika school there is a wide variety of opinion, a wide range of views some of which differ greatly from the kind of short general presentation that dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po gives. Strictly speaking, even the name "Vaibhāṣika school" should be limited to followers of the Mahāvibhāṣā, an Abhidharma text that was never translated into Tibetan.

Also, the division of the Sautrāntika school into those following scripture and those following reasoning is highly controversial. The former are said to follow Vasubandhu's own commentary on his Abhidharmakośa, in which he indicates disagreement with many assertions of the Vaibhāṣika school as presented in his own root text. The latter—the Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning—are said to be followers of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti who (despite the fact that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti do not assert external objects) assert external objects—objects that are different entities from the consciousnesses perceiving them. Again, neither of these groups saw themselves as sub-divisions of a larger school called the Sautrāntika.

Similarly, the two sub-divisions of the Cittamātra school are those following scripture, who depend on the writings primarily of Asaṅga and his half-brother Vasubandhu (after the latter converted to Asaṅga's system), and those following reasoning, who depend on what is accepted to be the main system of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's writings. Again, it is unlikely that these two [page 176] groups perceived themselves as being sub-schools of a larger school. Rather, the groupings are the results of later schematizations that are based on similarities between their systems but are committed to the accepted dictum that there are only four schools of tenets.

Also, the names of the two sub-divisions of the Mādhyamika school—the Autonomy school and the Consequence school—were, as is clearly admitted by Tsong kha pa and his followers, never used in India. Rather, these names were coined in Tibet in accordance with terms used by Candrakīrti in his writings. Thus, the very format of the four schools and their sub-divisions does not represent a historical account of self-asserted identities but is the result of centuries of classification of systems in India and Tibet. Its purpose is to give the scholar a handle on the vast scope of positions found in Indian Buddhism.

Given this situation, the format of four schools can be seen as a horizon that opens a way to appreciate the plethora of opinions, not as one that closes and rigidifies investigation. In Tibet, students are taught this fourfold classification first, without mention of the diversity of opinion that it conceals. Then, over decades of study, students gradually recognize the structure of such presentations of schools of thought as a technique for gaining access to a vast store of opinion, as a way to focus on topics crucial to authors within Indian Buddhism. The task of then distinguishing between what is clearly said in the Indian texts and what is interpretation and interpolation over centuries of commentary becomes a fascinating enterprise for the more hardy among Tibetan scholars. The devotion to debate as the primary mode of education provides an ever-present avenue for students to challenge home-grown interpretations, and affords a richness of critical commentary within the tradition that a short presentation of tenets does not convey.

In dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po's text, each Buddhist school is treated under four major topics, the last having numerous subdivisions:

1. Definition
2. Subschools
3. Etymology[page 177]
4. Assertions of tenets
   1. Assertions on the basis
      1. Objects: the two truths, etc.
      2. Object-possessors (i.e., subjects)
         1. Persons
         2. Consciousnesses
         3. Terms

   2. Assertions on the paths
      1. Objects of observation of the paths
      2. Objects abandoned by the paths
      3. Nature of the paths

   3. Assertions on the fruits of the paths

First, for general orientation, a reader is given a definition of the school, its sub-schools, and an etymology of its name. Then the tenets of the school are introduced. The topics considered under the heading of "assertions of tenets" reveal the soteriological orientation of the inquiry. The assertions are divided into three categories—presentations of the basis, the paths, and the fruits of the path. The presentation of the basis refers to assertions on classes of phenomena, which provide the basis for practicing the spiritual paths, which, in turn, produce attainments, the fruits of the path. It is clear from this order that the reason for philosophical learning about phenomena is to enable practice of a path that can transform the mind from being mired in a condition of suffering to being enlightened in a state of freedom.

The general structure of basis, paths, and fruits probably takes its lead from the emphasis in texts of the Mādhyamika School on three coordinated sets of twos:

1. (1) the two truths—conventional and ultimate—which are the basis
2. (2) the two practices—method and wisdom—which are the paths
3. (3) the two Buddha Bodies—Form Bodies and Truth Body— which are the final fruits of the path.

According to the Great Vehicle as described in these texts, taking as one's basis conventional truths, one practices the paths of method—love, compassion, and the altruistic intention to become enlightened as well the compassionate deeds that these induce—in dependence upon which one achieves the fruit of the Form Bodies [page 178] of a buddha. Also, taking as one's basis ultimate truths, one practices the paths of wisdom—especially the realization of the final status of persons and phenomena, their emptiness of inherent existence—in dependence upon which one achieves the fruit of a Truth Body of a buddha. This threefold format of basis, path, and fruit that finds its main expression in the Great Vehicle seems to have supplied the structure for the genre of presentations of tenets for both the Lesser Vehicle7 and the Great Vehicle.

Objects. Within the section on the basis, the emphasis on the two truths in all four schools derives from the fact that the two truths are a prime subject in the tenets of what is considered to be the highest school, the Mādhyamika. As Gung thang dKon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me (1762-1823),8 who was the chief student of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, says, the prime way that the Vaibhāṣika school and the Sautrāntika school delineate the meaning of the scriptures is by way of the Four Noble Truths, whereas the Cittamātra school accomplishes this through the doctrine of the three natures and the Mādhyamika school through the doctrine of the two truths (see DN: 80, 235). Thus, the emphasis given in this presentation of tenets to the four schools' delineations of the two truths derives from the system that the author and his tradition have determined to be the highest, the Mādhyamika school. This is not to say that the two truths are not important topics in all four schools, for they are; rather, the two truths are not the central topic in the other schools in the way that they are in the Mādhyamika school.

Object-Possessors. Having presented a school's assertions on objects, the text considers object-possessors, or subjects. Object-possessors are treated as being of three types—persons (since they possess objects), consciousnesses (since they are aware of objects), and terms (since they refer to objects).

One might wonder why there is a section on persons if Buddhist schools advocate a view of selflessness. In this Tibetan delineation of Indian schools of Buddhism, the term "self" in "selflessness" refers not to persons but to an over-reified status of phenomena, be these persons or other phenomena. Consequently, even though it is said that in general "self" (ātman, bdag), "person" (pudgala, gang zag), and "I" (aham, nga) are coextensive, in the particular context of the selflessness of persons "self" and "person" are not at all coextensive and do not at all have the same meaning.[page 179] In the term "selflessness of persons," "self" refers to a falsely imagined status that needs to be refuted, and "persons" refers to existent beings who are the basis with respect to which that refutation is made. All of these schools, therefore, believe that persons exist. They do not claim that persons are mere creations of ignorance.

A question between the schools concerns the nature of the person. According to dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po and his dGe lugs pa predecessors, all schools except the Mādhyamika Prāsaṅgika posit something from within the bases of designation of a person as being the person. In contrast, the Prāsaṅgika school holds that even though a person is designated in dependence upon mind and body, the person is neither mind nor body, being just the I that is designated in dependence upon mind and body. Following the lead of Candrakīrti, recognized by most as the founder of the Prāsaṅgika school, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po identifies how in the other schools some factor among the five aggregates (forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses) is considered to be the person when sought analytically. The Vaibhāṣikas, in general, are said to hold that the mere collection of the mental and physical aggregates is the person, whereas some of the five Saṃmitīya subschools are said to maintain that all five aggregates are the person—dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po's suggestion being that, for them, each of the five aggregates is the person (although the absurdity of one person being five persons would seem difficult not to notice). Another subschool, the Avantaka, is said to assert that the mind alone is the person.

Similarly, in the Sautrāntika school, the Followers of Scripture are said to assert that the continuum of the aggregates is the person, whereas the Followers of Reasoning are said to maintain that the mental consciousness is the person. In the Cittamātra school, the Followers of Scripture hold that the mind-basis-of-all (ālayavijñāna, kun gzhi rnam par shes pa) is the person, whereas the Followers of Reasoning assert that the mental consciousness is. Again, in the Autonomy school, both Yogic Autonomists and Sūtra Autonomists are said to assert that a subtle, neutral mental consciousness is what is found to be the person when it is searched for among its bases of designation.

For the most part, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po's delineation of what these schools assert to be the person is a matter of conjecture and not a reporting of forthright statements of these [page 180] schools' own texts. Though it is clear that most of these schools (if not all) accept that persons exist, it is by no means clear in their own literature that they assert that something from within the bases of designation of a person is the person. Rather, it would seem that, as presented in Vasubandhu's commentary on the ninth chapter of his Abhidharmakośa,9 persons are merely asserted to be non-associated compositional factors (viprayuktasaṃskāra, ldan min 'du byed) and thus an instance of the fourth aggregate, compositional factors, without a specific identification of any of the five aggregates that are a person's bases of designation as the person. For instance, one could quite safely say that there is not a single line in the whole of Indian Cittamātra literature that explicitly asserts that the mind-basis-of-all is the person. Rather, such an assertion is deduced from the fact that Cittamātrins Following Scripture (that is to say, the followers of Asaṅga) assert that the mind-basis-of-all travels from lifetime to lifetime carrying with it the karmic predispositions established by earlier actions. Bhāvaviveka, on the other hand, seems openly to assert that the mental consciousness is the person, when, in response to a challenge, he says that if the opponent is attempting to establish for him that consciousness is the person, he is proving what is already established for him (see Hopkins, 1983: 695-696). In any case, the emphasis of the dGe lugs pa treatises on identifying, for each of these schools, what, from among the five aggregates, the person is comes from their acceptance of Candrakīrti's claim to a unique assertion that nothing from among them is the person.

Thus, it can be seen that the very structure (basis, paths, and fruits) and the choice of topics (such as the two truths and assertions on the person) do not altogether arise from prime concerns within each school, but are brought over from focal issues in other schools, particularly those considered to be higher. That topics of prime concern in the "higher" schools dominate to some extent the presentation of the tenets of all four schools is natural, given that the main aim is to draw readers into realizing the impact of the views of the "higher" systems. This genre never seeks to give isolated presentations of these schools' views or a predominantly historical account.

Consciousnesses. The main focus of the tenets concerning consciousness is to identify the different types of minds in terms of misapprehension and correct apprehension. The purpose is to provide a psychological structure for the therapeutic paths that cause [page 181] a person to proceed gradually from misconceived notions about the nature of persons and other phenomena to states of mind that can counteract innate misconceptions. The liberative directionality of the overall enterprise informs the course of the discussion, the main interest being to separate correctly perceiving from improperly perceiving consciousnesses and to identify the difference between conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses. The latter, when they realize selflessness, are considered to be more powerful for overcoming obstructions to liberation and to full enlightenment.

The topics of consciousness are presented in their richest detail in the chapter on the Sautrāntika school, specifically the Sautrāntika Following Reasoning; correspondingly, the topic of terms is discussed most fully in the chapter on the Vaibhāṣika school. Thus, in many respects such books are to be read cumulatively, bringing over to another system those assertions that, although they come from a different system, are concordant with its outlook. The book does not always make clear what is to be carried over and what is not; such information is, however, supplied by the oral tradition, i.e., by a competent teacher.

Paths. Having presented a general outline of phenomena, the basis, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po presents the various schools' tenets on the spiritual paths which are founded on their respective assertions about the basis. The paths are described in terms of (1) the main objects of meditation, (2) the main misconceptions that are abandoned through such meditation, and (3) the layout of the paths.

In all four schools, paths are presented for hearers (śrāvaka, nyan thos), solitary realizers (pratyekabuddha, rang rgyal), and bodhisattvas. It might seem, at first reading, to be surprising that even the Lesser Vehicle schools—the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools—should have paths for bodhisattvas, since bodhisattvas are associated primarily with the Great Vehicle. However, a distinction is made between philosophical schools, which are divided into Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle, and practitioners of paths, which also are divided into Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle. The philosophical schools are divided in this way according to whether they present a selflessness of phenomena (Great Vehicle) or whether they do not (Lesser Vehicle). Since the Great Vehicle tenet systems—the Cittamātra and Mādhyamika schools—present a selflessness of phenomena in addition to a selflessness of persons, [page 182] they also speak of "obstructions to omniscience" (jñeyāvaraṇa, shes sgrib), these being what prevent simultaneous and direct cognition of all phenomena as well as their final nature. The Lesser Vehicle schools, on the other hand, make no such claims even though they present buddhahood as having an omniscience which can serially know anything, but not simultaneously.10

Even though the Lesser Vehicle schools—the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools—do not present a path leading to simultaneous and direct knowledge of all phenomena, they do speak of the path of a bodhisattva proceeding to buddhahood when they relate how Śākyamuni Buddha, for instance, became enlightened. Similarly, the Great Vehicle schools—Cittamātra and Mādhyamika—speak, not just about how bodhisattvas proceed on the path but also about how hearers and solitary realizers, who are Lesser Vehicle practitioners, proceed on the path. In the latter case, the Great Vehicle schools are not reporting how the Lesser Vehicle schools present the path, but how the Great Vehicle schools themselves present the path for those beings—hearers and solitary realizers—whose prime motivation, unlike that of bodhisattvas, is, for the time being, not the welfare of others but their own liberation from cyclic existence. Therefore, it is said to be possible for someone who is, for instance, a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika doctrinally to be a Lesser Vehicle practitioner by motivation, in that the person has decided for the time being to pursue his or her own liberation first before becoming primarily dedicated to the welfare of others. Also, it is possible for someone who is, for instance, a Vaibhāṣika to be a Great Vehicle practitioner in terms of motivation, having become dedicated to achieving the enlightenment of a buddha in order to be of service to all beings.

Fruits of the Paths. The three types of paths—hearer, solitary realizer, and bodhisattva—have different results or fruits. The first two lead to liberation from cyclic existence, whereas the last leads to buddhahood, a state free from both the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence and from the obstructions to the omniscience of a buddha, as described in the respective systems.

Though one of the purposes of such presentations of tenets undoubtedly is to create a hierarchical structure that puts one's own system at the top, this genre of literature functions primarily to [page 183] provide a comprehensive worldview. Its presentations, ranging from the phenomena of the world through to the types of enlightenment, give students a framework for study and practice as well as a perspective for relating with other beings. The worldview that emerges is of individuals bound by misconception in a round of suffering and mired in afflictive emotions counterproductive to their own welfare, but also poised on a threshold of transformation. The uncontrolled course of cyclic existence is viewed as lacking a solid underpinning; it is ready to be transformed into a patterned advance toward liberation. The starkness of the harrowing appraisal of the current situation of multilayered pain stands in marked contrast to the optimistic view of the development that is possible. Such optimism stems from a perception that the afflictive emotions and obstructions that are the cause of misery are not endemic to the mind, but are peripheral to its nature and thus subject to antidotal influences that can remove them. The hierarchical presentation, fortified with reasoned explanation, itself inculcates the basic posture that the power of reason can penetrate the false veils of appearance and lead to a liberative reality. Presentations of tenets are founded on confidence in the mind's ability to overcome tremendous obstacles to the point where love, compassion, and altruism can be expressed in effective, continuous activity, and, therefore, they do more than just structure Indian Buddhist systems; they structure practitioners' perception of their place in a dynamic worldview.

Dalai Lama II, dGe 'dun rgya mtsho

GTGDGrub mtha' rgya mtshor 'jug pa'i gru rdzings. Varanasi: Ye shes stobs ldan, 1969.

dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po

GTRPGrub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba. In The Collected Works of dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, vol. 6, pp. 485-535. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972. For a critical edition: K. Mimaki. Le Grub mtha' rnam bźag rin chen phreṅ ba de dKon mchog 'jigs med dbaṅ po (1728-1791).Zinbun14: 55-112. The Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University, 1977.

Grags pa bshad sgrub, Co ne ba

GTDPGrub mtha' thams cad kyi snying po bsdus pa. Delhi: Mey College of Sera, 1969.[page 185]

Gung thang dKon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me

DNDrang nges rnam 'byed kyi dga' 'grel rtsom 'phro legs bshad snying po'i yang snying. Sarnath: Guru Deva, 1965.

Hopkins, Jeffrey

1983Meditation on Emptiness. London: Wisdom.

1987Emptiness Yoga. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

Iida, Shotaro

1980Reason and Emptiness. Tokyo: Hokuseido.

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus

GTCMGrub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong/ Grub mtha' chen mo. Musoorie: Dalama, 1962.

Jha, G.

1937-39The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntirakṣita with the commentary of Kamalaśīla. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, vols. 80 and 83. Baroda: Oriental Institute.

Klein, Anne C.

1986Knowledge and Liberation: Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology in Support of Transformative Religious Experience. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

1990Knowing, Naming, and Negation. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

Klong chen rab 'byams

GTRDTheg pa mtha' dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa'i mtha' rin po che'i mdzod. Gangtok: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche, 1969(?).

lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje

GTDGGrub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan. Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970.

Lopez, Donald S., Jr.

l986A Study of Svātantrika. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

Mimaki, Katsumi

1982Blo gsal grub mtha'. Kyoto: Université de Kyoto.

Nyima, Geshé Ngawang

1970Introduction to the Doctrines of the Four Schools of Buddhist Philosophy. Leiden, N.p.

Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa

GTTBGrub mtha'i rnam bzhag blo gsal spro ba bskyed pa'i ljon pa phas rgol brag ri 'joms pa'i tho ba. Buxador, n.d.[page 186]

Poussin, Louis de La Vallée

1923-31 L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Paris: Geuthner.

rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan

GTNZGrub mtha'i rnam gzhag. Bylakuppe: Se-ra Byes Grwa-tshaṅ, 1977.

Ruegg, David Seyfort

1981The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Shastri, Swami Dwarikadas, ed.

1970Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārtha Commentary of Ācārya Yaṣomitra. Bauddha Bharati Series5. Banaras: Bauddha Bharati.

Shes rab rin chen, sTag tshang lo tsā ba

GTKSGrub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho. Thimphu: Kun bzang stobs rgyal, 1976.

Snellgrove, David L.

1987Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: Indian Buddhists and Their Tibetan Successors. Boston: Shambhala.

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup and Jeffrey Hopkins

1990Cutting Through Appearances: The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

1976Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism. London: Rider.

Thu'u bkvan Blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma

GTSMGrub mtha' thams cad kyi khungs dang 'dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long. Sarnath: Chhos Je Lama, 1963.

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[page 187] Texts of the bsdus grwa genre were some of the most influential works of Tibetan philosophical literature, since more than any other genre of text they determined how scholastics in the predominant dGe lugs pa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism reasoned and conceptualized. The term bsdus grwa or bsdus rwa originally probably meant bsdus pa slob pa'i sde tshan gyi grwa or "the schools or classes in which [primary students] learn bsdus pa or summarized topics [of logic or dialectics]." Later, the term was etymologized as rig pa'i rnam grangs du ma phyogs gcig tu bsdus pa'i grwa, or "the class where many arguments are summarized together."1 In modern usage, the term has both a general and a more restricted meaning. bsDus grwa in its broad sense means the introductory course or classes in dialectics, which consist of the three categories: bsdus grwa (in the narrow sense; ontology), blo rigs (epistemology) and rtags rigs (logic). Without mastering these basic stages, a student cannot advance any further in the dGe lugs pa tradition of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism.

Although there exist a few differences in the dGe lugs pa monastic curricula among different colleges, in the main there are five principal subjects to be taught, which are known as the "five books" (po ṭi lnga): (1) Pramāṇa (tshad ma), (2) Prajñāpāramitā (phar phyin), (3) Madhyamaka (dbu ma), (4) Vinaya ('dul ba), and (5) [page 188] Abhidharmakośa (mngon mdzod). Each of these subjects is divided into small classes (called 'dzin grwa), and by advancing through these classes—a process which takes at least ten years—one can finally attain the degree of dge bshes (see Newland, in this volume).

Here we should remark that the last four of these five subjects, i.e., Prajñāpāramitā, Madhyamaka, Vinaya and Abhidharmakośa, are studied in direct dependence upon original Indian texts (rgya gzhung). As for Pramāṇa, however, the initial study by dGe lugs pa monks is undertaken exclusively on the basis of the native Tibetan bsdus grwa literature, rather than Indian texts, and at this initial stage the subject of study is commonly called bsdus grwa or rigs lam, instead of tshad ma (pramāṇa: Indian Buddhist logic and epistemology) properly speaking.

All monastic universities are composed of a number of grwa tshang, or self-supported colleges, and most of these colleges have a few khang tshan, or regional houses. Students live in khang tshans associated with their native place, and during the school term they attend their appointed class ('dzin grwa) in the grwa tshang. One year is divided into seven or eight school terms. Apart from the two terms of mid summer and mid winter, lessons are held inside the college.2

As we have said, the course of bsdus grwa can be divided into the following three stages: bsdus grwa (in the narrow sense), blo rigs and rtags rigs. Roughly speaking, these three treat of ontology, epistemology and logic, respectively. This threefold classification is sometimes expressed as the study of "objects" (yul), "subjects" (yul can), and "the ways to cognize objects" (yul de rtogs pa'i tshul). The precise contents of bsdus grwa texts are not completely uniform, but these texts do nonetheless share a corpus of principal subjects or "lessons" (rnam bzhag).

Let us now briefly examine the contents of bsdus grwa, blo rigs and rtags rigs by focusing on a few representative subjects. The first stage of the primary course is bsdus grwa in its narrow sense, generally comprised of three lessons. The first, which is common to all colleges, is known as "kha dog dkar dmar," which literally means "white and red colors." Some colleges even assign a separate class ('dzin grwa) to the subject. At this stage, students learn [page 189] about the notion of pervasion or entailment (khyab pa), as occurs, for example, between white color and color itself—the former entailing the latter. Similarly, students learn to differentiate between general propositions involving pervasions, such as "whatever is red must be a color" (dmar po yin na kha dog yin pas khyab), and those involving specific topics (chos can), such as "take as the topic, red; it is a color" (dmar po chos can kha dog yin) (see Tillemans: 286).

In the next class, called gzhi grub (literally, "established bases"), students are introduced to some ontological notions construed more or less in accordance with the system of the Indian Sautrāntika school, especially as it is portrayed by Dharmakīrti. Here again, students pay special attention to the inclusions and differentiations holding among the key concepts.

After completing this initial class, students proceed to the next, where they learn more abstract and theoretical notions. At this level, schemata necessary for logical thinking such as concept (ldog pa, literally "isolate"), cause and effect (rgyu dang 'bras bu), genus and species (spyi dang bye brag), relations and contraries ('brel ba dang 'gal ba) and definition and definiendum (mtshan nyid dang mtshon bya) are introduced and examined.3 In the last class of this first stage, students learn to use the thal 'gyur (prasaṅga) argumentation form, i.e., "consequences" or "reductio ad absurdum" (see Onoda, 1986, 1988) and other logical operators such as "implicative negations" and "non-implicative negations" (ma yin dgag dang med dgag). In short, the purpose of this first stage, i.e., bsdus grwa as more narrowly conceived, is not only to introduce students to basic theoretical schemata, but also to allow them to acquire the practical mastery of debating techniques which will be indispensable for more advanced dialectical study.

When a student has finished the initial stage of bsdus grwa classes, he is allowed to proceed to the next stage, i.e., blo rigs, which is largely concerned with epistemological matters. The main subjects are the classifications of cognition in terms of "valid and invalid means of cognition" (tshad ma dang tshad min), "conceptual and non-conceptual cognition" (rtog pa dang rtog med), "self-awareness and other-awareness" (rang rig dang gzhan rig) and "mind and mental factors" (sems dang sems byung). These classifications in turn frequently admit of sub-classifications. For example, invalid means of cognition (tshad min) is divided into five: subsequent cognition (dpyad shes), true presumption (yid dpyod), inattentive cognition (snang la ma nges pa), doubt (the tshom), and erroneous [page 190] cognition (log shes). Valid means of cognition (tshad ma) is divided into two: direct perception (mngon sum gyi tshad ma) and inference (rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma). It should be noted that this type of sevenfold division of cognition (blo rigs bdun du dbye ba) is said to have originated with Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) (see van der Kuijp, 1979).

The last stage, rtags rigs (see Onoda, 1981), introduces an Indian type of logic centered around the elaboration of the threefold criteria—the so-called tshul gsum (or trairūpya)—which enables one to distinguish between correct, or valid, logical marks (rtags yang dag) and those which are invalid, or more literally are pseudo-marks (rtags ltar snang).

These three types of texts—bsdus grwa, blo rigs and rtags rigs—teach students the practical applications of disputation or debate (rtsod pa). One of the main reasons why adepts of such a training are called mtshan nyid pa is that they pay special attention to terms and definitions (mtshan nyid), memorizing them and analysing them for inconsistencies, insufficiencies and redundancies. A further reason as to why this preliminary training is so indispensable is that the school manuals (yig cha) for advanced classes such as Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka are written in the special style and format which we find in bsdus grwa texts. This format, where arguments are presented largely by means of prasaṅgas (thal 'gyur), was christened thal phyir, or "sequence and reason," by Stcherbatsky (55), who maintained that it probably had its origins with Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (see Jackson, 1987: 152, n. 28; cf. van der Kuijp, 1983: 294, n. 220).

Both the conventional style and contents of the so-called bsdus grwa literature are widely said to have originated with the eighteen bsdus grwa subjects of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge. According to A khu rin po che's list of rare books, Phya pa wrote two Pramāṇa summaries: one entitled Tshad [ma'i] bsdus [pa] yid kyi mun sel (MHTL 11805) and the other Tshad ma'i bsdus pa yid kyi mun sel rang 'grel dang bcas pa (MHTL 11804). Probably one was a verse work and the other was its autocommentary. According to Śākya mchog ldan (1428-1507), Phya pa wrote not only these Pramāṇa summaries but also an dBu ma bsdus pa ("Madhyamaka Summary"). Aside from Phya pa, other scholars of gSang phu Monastery are also [page 191] said to have written texts entitled bsdus pa. For instance, rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags who was a student of rNgog lo tsā ba (1059-1109) is said to have written several Tshad ma'i bsdus pa (MHTL 11810).4 gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge (twelfth century) wrote an dBu ma'i bsdus pa. Chu mig pa (thirteenth century) who was an abbot of gSang phu Upper Monastery, also wrote a Tshad ma bsdus pa (NTTR: 453). Even among the works of 'U yug pa (thirteenth century) of the early Sa skya pa we can find the title bsDus pa rigs sgrub, though this may simply be an abridgment of his famous Pramāṇa work. Although we cannot be sure about the contents of these works until the texts themselves appear, the term bsdus pa in their titles probably can be translated as "Summary." But as noted above, such a term was not used only for Pramāṇa summaries in the early period (twelfth to thirteenth centuries).

According to Klong rdol bla ma (1719-1794/5),5 Phya pa summarized Pramāṇa theories into the following eighteen subjects in his Tshad ma'i bsdus pa yid kyi mun sel:

1. (1) white and red colors (kha dog dkar dmar)
2. (2) substantial phenomena and conceptual phenomena (rdzas chos ldog chos)
3. (3) contraries and non-contraries ('gal dang mi 'gal)
4. (4) genus and species (spyi dang bye brag)
5. (5) related and unrelated ('brel dang ma 'brel)
6. (6) difference and non-difference (tha dad thad [= tha dad] min)
7. (7) positive and negative concomitances (rjes su 'gro ldog)
8. (8) cause and effect (rgyu dang 'bras bu)
9. (9) the three times (snga bcan bar bcan phyi bcan)
10. (10)definition and definiendum (mtshan mtshon)
11. (11) [prasaṅgas] with multiple reasons and multiple predicates (rtags mang gsal mang)
12. (12) exclusionary negations and determinations (dgag pa phar tshur)
13. (13) direct and indirect contraries (dngos 'gal rgyud 'gal)
14. (14) equal pervasions (khyab mnyam)
15. (15) being and non-being (yin gyur min gyur)
16. (16) negation of being and negation of non-being (yin log min log)
17. (17) cognizing existence and cognizing nonexistence (yod rtogs med rtogs)
18. (18) cognizing permanence and cognizing real entities (rtag rtogs dngos rtogs)[page 192]

The great scholar Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251), in his Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter, criticised many of Phya pa's theories, showing how the latter's ideas differ from those of Indian Buddhist philosophers, who for Sa paṇ were the only source of authentic Buddhism. Sa skya Paṇḍita's criticisms relied predominantly on Dharmakīrti's own texts, with the result that after Sa paṇ, the theoretical focus of Pramāṇa studies in Tibet slowly but gradually shifted away from Phya pa's so-called Tibetan style to Sa skya Paṇḍita's more Indian-based orientation. Nonetheless, on the practical level, most dGe lugs pa and to some extent even Sa skya pa scholars continued to practice Phya pa's style of logic, debating on such typical Phya pa subjects as substantial and conceptual phenomena (rdzas chos ldog chos), even though some were aware that such subjects were simply Tibetan in origin.6 Especially in the dGe lugs pa school, with the establishment of the big monastic universities, it was the bsdus grwa tradition propagated by Phya pa that continued as the primary practice for beginners in dialectics.

About three centuries after Phya pa's activity, mChog lha 'od zer (1429-1500),7 who occupied the abbatial seat of gSang phu just as Phya pa had previously done, composed the manual known as the Ra bstod bsdus grwa. This text was widely used as the beginner's manual not only in the dGe lugs pa monasteries but also, it is said, in one or two Sa skya pa seminaries (such as at modern Na-lendra). mChog lha 'od zer wrote this text mostly based on Phya pa's tradition but also adopted a few elements of Sa skya Paṇḍita's position.8

Even after the three major dGe lugs pa monasteries in the Lhasa area had developed their own sets of debate manuals (yig cha), the Ra bstod bsdus grwa was still used by dGe lugs pa monks when they began their basic Pramāṇa studies. Another famous bsdus grwa text, the bTsan po bsdus grwa, was written at the Ra bstod college of gSang phu by gSer khang pa Dam chos rnam rgyal (seventeenth century), who served as the twenty-first abbot of the Ra bstod college, i.e., fourteen abbots later than mChog lha 'od zer (Vostrikov: 61) (see Onoda, 1989c, 1991). Unfortunately, since the text is lost, we know only the subject headings in the bTsan po bsdus grwa, but [page 193] they can be seen to exhibit a close resemblance to those of mChog lha 'od zer's work.9

The bTsan po bsdus grwa was written in response to a request from Ngag dbang 'phrin las lhun grub (1622-1699). The word "bTsan po" stands for "bTsan po no mon han," which was the honorific title of Ngag dbang 'phrin las lhun grub, the teacher of the celebrated dGe lugs pa author of scholastic manuals 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje (1648-1721), who in turn served as the teacher of Sras Ngag dbang bkra bshis (1678-1738), author of the influential Sras bsdus grwa used in 'Bras spungs sGo mang College. So, in short, we can say that Ngag dbang 'phrin las lhun grub was probably the person who served as the link between the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa tradition of bsdus grwa and the bsdus grwa tradition which had been handed down at gSang phu Monastery since Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge.

It is as yet unknown how many bsdus grwa texts Ngag dbang 'phrin las himself actually wrote, but we are informed (van der Kuijp, 1989: 16) that he wrote a bsDus grwa'i rnam bzhag cha tshang ba'i rig gnas legs bshad bang mdzod (Smith: 70), which has the following six subjects:

1. (1) pervasions (khyab mtha')
2. (2) negation of being and negation of non-being (yin log min log)
3. (3) cause and effect (rgyu 'bras)
4. (4) definition and definiendum (mtshan mtshon)
5. (5) genus and species (spyi bye brag)
6. (6) substantial phenomena and conceptual phenomena (rdzas ldog)

It should be noted that in the Complete Works of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje there is a bsdus grwa text entitled Kha dog dkar dmar,10 which has exactly the same six subjects as Ngag dbang 'phrin las lhun grub's shorter work. Here then is possible further confirmation of the relationship between the gSang phu lineage of bsdus grwa studies of Ngag dbang 'phrin las and that of sGo mang College.

The Complete Works of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje has four other titles which are concerned with bsdus grwa:11

1. (1) Presentation of bsdus grwa called "elegant description" (bsDus grwa'i rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa)[page 194]
2. (2) A summary of the advanced presentation of prasaṅga (Thal 'gyur che ba'i rnam bzhag mdor bsdus)
3. (3) Advanced presentation of bsdus grwa called "the golden key to open the art of science" (bsDus chen gyi rnam bzhag rigs lam gser gyi sgo 'byed)
4. (4) The essence of bsdus grwa called "the treasury of whole presentations" in verse (bsDus sbyor gyi snying po kun bsdus rig pa'i mdzod rtsa tshig)

In addition to these bsdus grwa of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, a number of other influential bsdus grwa texts were written as college manuals for the dGe lugs pa monastic universities.12 Blo gsal gling College of 'Bras spungs Monastery used Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa's (1478-1554) bsdus grwa. sGo mang College used not only the above-mentioned bsdus grwas of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, but also that of Ngag dbang bkra shis, which was commonly known as the Khri rgan tshang gi bsdus grwa or Sras ngag dbang bkra shis bsdus grwa because the author was a chief disciple (sras) of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje (Vostrikov: 61).13

Perhaps nowadays the most widely used bsdus grwa is the Phur lcog bsdus grwa, which was adopted as a school manual in the Byes pa College of Se ra Monastery (Perdue). The text is also called the Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa (Onoda, 1981) because its author, Phur bu lcog Byams pa tshul khrims rgya mtsho dpal bzang po (1825-1901), was the personal teacher (yongs 'dzin) of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama.14

The bsdus grwa of the Sa skya pa has so far hardly been studied at all. Here I will just enumerate the few such treatises known to me, without trying to indicate their relation to the dGe lugs pa bsdus grwa or earlier gSang phu traditions. To begin with, 'U yug pa Rigs pa'i seng ge (b.1250s or 1260s) who was a disciple of Sa skya Paṇḍita, is said to have written a (Tshad ma'i) bsDus pa which was entitled bsDus pa rigs sgrub (ZNDG: 469.3) or bsDus don rigs pa'i sdom (DGPK: 323). According to the list of the sDe dge printing house, a certain Byang chub dpal wrote a Tshad bsdus legs bshad rig pa'i 'od zer (DGPK: 145) and this may be an early Sa skya pa tshad ma'i bsdus pa. The outstanding scholastic gYag ston Sangs rgyas dpal (1348-1414) wrote a rtags rigs work (SCNT: 74). Likewise, mKhas grub bstan gsal (fl. fifteenth century), disciple of [page 195] Byams chen rab 'byams pa (1411-1485), is said to have written a Tshad ma'i rtags rigs chen mo (see van der Kuijp, 1989: 17). Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge (1429-1489) is said to have learned bsdus grwa in Khams using the bsDus grwa of dGe ba rgyal mtshan (1387-1462), who was the third abbot of Na-lendra Monastery (Jackson, 1989: 34). Go rams pa's disciple Kong ston dBang phyug grub (late 1400s), who was the second abbot of rTa nag Thub bstan rnam rgyal Monastery, wrote a Tshad ma'i spyi don blo rtag[s] (SKKC: 67). In about the same period, Glo bo mkhan chen bSod nams lhun grub (1456-1532) wrote blo rigs and rtags rigs texts entitled Blo'i rnam bzhag sde bdun gyi snying po and rTags kyi rnam bzhag rigs lam gsal ba'i sgron me (Jackson, 1987: 564). Such works continued to appear in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Mang thos Klu sgrub rgya mtsho (1523-1596), for instance, is said to have written a Blo rigs chen po (mo?) (SKKC: 100), and the famous Sa skya pa scholar Ngag dbang chos grags (1572/3-1641/2) wrote a blo rigs entitled Blo rigs gi legs bshad (SKKC: 108). Within the later lineage of Go rams pa's monastery, rTa nag Thub bstan rnam rgyal, there appeared the most famous recent Sa skya pa bsdus grwa, the Chos rnam rgyal gi bsdus grwa. A copy of this text is preserved at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala. The author, Chos rnam rgyal (fl. seventeenth century) also wrote a rtags rigs.16 The most recent of such works in the Sa skya pa tradition were written by Blo gter dbang po (1847-1914?), who also got his initial training at rTa nag Thub bstan rnam rgyal Monastery. The bsdus grwa works he composed were entitled Blo rigs zur bkol, rTags rigs zur bkol (SKKC: 162), and Tshad ma rtags rigs skor gtan la 'bebs par byed pa sde bdun sgo brgya 'byed pa'i 'phrul gyi lde'u mig (DGPK: 326).

The bsdus grwa logic was not just a training exercise, but was important for all levels of Tibetan philosophical studies in the gSang phu and dGe lugs pa traditions. As for the relationship to the Indian tradition, only a careful and detailed investigation and comparison of the bsdus grwa literature and the more Indian-based rigs gter tradition of the Sa skya school will enable us to discriminate meaningfully between the Indian and Tibetan elements in this system of logic. At any rate, the importance of this complex Indo-Tibetan relationship should not be underestimated. Anyone [page 196] who wishes to investigate seriously the indigenous Tibetan commentaries on such key Indian texts as the Pramāṇavārttika is confronted immediately by the fact that much of the terminology and many of the concepts used in such commentaries owe a heavy debt to the bsdus grwa.

A khu chin Shes rab rgya mtsho

MHTLdPe rgyun dkon pa 'ga' zhig gi tho yig: Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature. Part 3, pp. 503-601. Śata-Piṭaka Series30. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1963.

bKra shis rdo rje, Ko btso

DGPKsDe dge'i par khang rig gnas kun 'dus gzhal med khang chos mdzod chen mo bkra shis sgo mang gi dkar chag rdo rje'i chos bdun ldan pa'i lde'u mig. Si khron: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1983.

Goldberg, Margaret E.

1985Entity and Antimony in Tibetan bsdus grwa Logic. Parts I and II. Journal of Indian Philosophy 13: 153-199, 273-304.

Horváth, Zoltán

1987 Review of van der Kuijp (1983). Indo-Iranian Journal 30/4: 314-321.[page 199]

Jackson, David P.

1987The Entrance Gate for the Wise. Vienna: Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde17, Parts 1 and 2.

1989The Early Abbots of 'Phan po Na-lendra: The Vicissitudes of a Great Tibetan Monastery in the 15th Century. Vienna: Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde23.

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje

JYSBThe Collected Works of 'Jam-Dbyaṅs-Bźad-Pa'i-Rdo-Rje, Reproduced from prints from the Bkra-śis-'khyil blocks. Ed. by Ngawang Gelek Demo. 15 vols. Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series, vols. 40-54. New Delhi: 1972-74.

'Jam dbyangs mChog lha 'od zer

RTDGTshad ma rnam 'grel gyi bsdus gzhung shes bya'i sgo 'byed rgol ngan glang po 'joms pa gdong lnga'i gad rgyangs rgyu rig lde mig, Rwa stod bsdus grwa. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1980.

Klong rdol bla ma Ngag dbang blo bzang

TNMGTshad ma rnam 'grel sogs gtan tshig rig pa las byung ba'i ming gi grangs. Śata-Piṭaka Series100, pp. 660-712. New Delhi: 1973.

van der Kuijp, Leonard

1979Phya-pa Chos-kyi seng-ge's Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory.Journal of Indian Philosophy 5: 355-369.

1983Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien26. Wiesbaden.

1989An Introduction to Gtsang-nag-pa's Tshad-ma rnam-par nges-pa'i ti-ka legs-bshad bsdus-pa, An Ancient Commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramāṇaviniścaya. Otani University Collection No. 13971. Kyoto: Otani University Tibetan Works SeriesII.

Kun dga' grol mchog

SCNTPaṇḍita chen po Śākya mchog ldan gyi rnam par thar pa zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa. In Collected Works of Śākya mchog ldan, vol. 16, pp. 1-233. Thimphu: 1975.

mKhan po A pad et al., compilers

SKKCdKar chag mthong bas yid 'phrog chos mdzod bye ba'i lde mig: A Bibliography of Sa skya pa Literature. New Delhi: Ngawang Topgyal, 1987.

Onoda Shunzo

1979Chibetto no sōin ni okeru mondō no ruikei [Pattern of the Tibetan Monacal Debate]. Bukkyō Shigaku Kenkyū [The Journal of the History of Buddhism] 22/1: 1-16.

1981The Yoṅs 'Dzin rTags Rigs: A Manual for Tibetan Logic. Studia Asiatica5. Nagoya University.[page 200]

1982Chibetto ni okeru ronrigaku kenkyū no mondai [Primary Course in Tibetan Monastic Universities]. Tōyō Gakujutsu Kenkyū [The Journal of Oriental Studies] 21/2: 193-205.

1983rJes 'gro ldog khyab ni tsuite [On rJes 'gro ldog khyab]. Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū [Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies] 32/1: 437-434.

1986Phya pa Chos Kyi Seng Ge's Classifications of Thal 'Gyur.Berliner Indologische Studien, Band 2: 65-85.

1988On the Tibetan Controversy Concerning the Various Ways of Replying to Prasaṅgas.The Tibet Journal 13/2: 36-41.

1989aChibetto no Gakumonji [Tibetan Monastic Universities]. Iwanamikoźa Tōyōshiso [Oriental Thoughts]. Series 11, chapter 3.1, pp. 352-373. Iwanami Shoten: Tokyo.

1989bbsDus grwa sho no keifu [Genealogy of bsdus grwa literature]. Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū [Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies] 37/2: 825-819.

1989cThe Chronology of the Abbatial Successions of the Gsaṅ phu sne'u thog Monastery.Wiener Zeitshrift für die Kunde Südasiens 33: 203-213.

1991Abbatial Successions of the Colleges of gSang phu sNe'u thog Monastery.Bulletin of the National Museum of Ethnology 15/4: 1049-1071.

1992Monastic Debate in Tibet—A Study on the History and Structures of Bsdus Grwa Logic. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde27. Vienna.

Perdue, Daniel Elmo

1976Introductory Debate in Tibetan Buddhism. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1976.

Phur bu lcog Ngag dbang byams pa

PKPBGrwa sa chen po bzhi dang rgyud pa stod smad chags tshul pad dkar 'phreng ba: Three Karchacks. Gedan Sungrab Series13, pp. 46-169. New Delhi: 1970.

Śākya mchog ldan

ZNDGChos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba'i rnam gzhag ji ltar grub pa'i yi ge gzu bor gnas pa'i mdzangs pa dga' byed. In his Collected Works, vol. 16, pp. 457-482. Thimphu: 1975.

NTTRrNgog lo tstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyangs pa'i tshul mdo tsam du bya ba ngo mtshar gtam gyi rol ma. In his Collected Works, vol. 16, pp. 443-456. Thimphu: 1975.

Smith, Gene

1969Tibetan Catalogue. Seattle: University of Washington.

Stcherbatsky, Th.

1932Buddhist Logic. Leningrad; reprint Tokyo: Meicho-Fukyū-kai, 1977.[page 201]

Su dhi pra sha ka and Sras Ngag dbang bkra shis

SNDGTshad ma'i dgongs don rtsa 'grel mkhas pa'i mgul rgyan. Ed. by DMu dge bSam gtan. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987.

Tillemans, Tom J. F.

1989Formal and Semantic Aspects of Tibetan Buddhist Debate Logic.Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 265-297.

Vostrikov, A.

1935-37Some Corrections and Critical Remarks on Dr. Johan van Manen's Contribution to the Bibliography of Tibet.Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 8: 60-62.

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[page 202] Yig cha are the required textbooks in the curriculum of Tibetan Buddhist monastic colleges (grwa tshang). They may be called "debate manuals" because they are often structured around a series of debates which provide rich fodder for the oral debates characteristic of Tibetan monastic education. The word yig cha literally means "record" or "notes." Debate manuals have value both as explicit doctrinal records of the evolution of Buddhist thought and as implicit social records of attitudes among educated monks toward faith, reason, education, and tradition. The genre can be traced back almost a millennium, with new works still appearing in this century.

Often composed by distinguished scholars at the invitation of their colleges, many debate manuals are actually Tibetan sub-sub-commentaries pertaining to Indian Buddhist treatises (śāstras) such as Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, Maitreya's Abhisamayālaṃkāra, and Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra. Thus, while debate manuals are by definition pedagogical works, intended to inform and to stimulate debate, the most noteworthy examples of the genre also involve elements of creative exegesis, polemic, and/or philosophical synthesis. If we believe that earlier formulations of a religious view are somehow more pure or more authentic—and therefore more worthy of academic concern—then we may dismiss debate manuals, along with Tibetan doxography (grub mtha') and [page 203] "grounds and paths" (sa lam) literature, as derivative, synthetic, post-classical scholasticism. However, if our interest is the life of Buddhist philosophy across generations of Tibetan scholars, and if we seek to know not just where tradition began but how it is remembered (and thus reshaped), then we must give debate manuals their due.

In the monastic colleges of the dGe lugs school debate manuals have been the primary focus of intellectual life for the last five or six centuries. This is certainly not to depreciate the enormous importance of Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357-1419) as the preeminent scholar and revered founder of the order, nor to imply a lack of reverence for Śākyamuni and the authors of the Mahāyāna treatises. Tibetan scholars do rely upon debate manuals for exegetical guidance through the "great books" of their tradition. The present Dalai Lama has reminded monks that they should not neglect to study Tsong kha pa's own writings. Yet the issuance of such a reminder, unnecessary for the best scholars, is indicative of the typical student's tendency to acquire Tsong kha pa's system in a secondhand way, relying heavily on the convenient and precise formulations of the debate manuals. Insofar as the colleges traditionally regard their manuals as ideal reformulations of the essential points of the treatises and commentaries, the focus on the manuals has tended to displace scholastic attention to the "great books."1

Monastic debate manuals bridge both historical and stylistic gaps by explicating the content of classical treatises in language patterned after and readily (re)assimilated to the scholastic oral debate tradition. Debate manuals, or substantial portions from them, are memorized by students and serve as the basis for (1) commentary by the teacher during class, and (2) debate among the students in the monastery courtyard after class. Thus, these manuals link the philosophy of the classical treatises to the living philosophy of courtyard debate, creating a shared universe for discourse among teachers and students of the same college. In Tibetan monastic debate, arguments must be framed as syllogisms (prayoga, sbyor ba) or consequences (prasaṅga, thal 'gyur), and the respondent must either challenge the sign (liṅga, rtags) (i.e., the minor premise), or the pervasion (vyāpti, khyab pa) (i.e., the major premise), or else accept the opponent's point. The same rules structure the debates in the manuals. Most manuals break down the [page 204] material into a series of topics, covering each topic in a tripartite schema: (1) debates refuting opposing systems (dgag pa), (2) a presentation of the author's own system (rang lugs bzhag pa) of definitions (mtshan nyid), etc., and (3) further debates dispelling objections (rtsod spong) posed by actual or hypothetical critics. This format allows authors to sharpen their arguments while creating text that their debate-trained readers find relatively easy to memorize for use in the courtyard. Conversely, debate manual authors must have derived some of their written debates from oral debates current in their respective colleges and generations.

Goldstein (21) estimates that twenty-six percent of traditional Tibet's male population were monks. Although Tibetans generally regard monks as superior to laymen, this high percentage is one reason that the official charisma of the robes was not potent enough to mark monks as an exclusive élite. In the dGe lugs, the dominant order of Tibetan Buddhism since the seventeenth century, scholarly achievement has been one of the most important paths into the élite circles of leadership. To understand this fact, we must reflect on the relationship between reason and liberation in Tsong kha pa's philosophy.

Like other Buddhists, Tsong kha pa and his dGe lugs pa followers contend that liberation from beginningless cycles of suffering is reached through non-dualistic (advaya, gnyis med) and trans-conceptual insight (nirvikalpajñāna, rtog med ye shes) into reality (dharmatā, chos nyid). However, for the dGe lugs pa this insight is not a spontaneous, naturally arising, objectless intuition. Rather it is something that must be gradually and systematically cultivated, and it has a specific, rationally comprehensible object—emptiness (śūnyatā, stong pa nyid). Although emptiness is the very nature of the mind, realization (rtogs pa) of this natural emptiness is a hard-won accomplishment. Realization of emptiness depends not only upon prior training in ethics, but upon conceptual mastery of what "emptiness" is and how logic can be used to approach it.

This philosophical stance reinforced the religious and political authority of those who controlled educational institutions equipped to provide the requisite training in logic and philosophy.2 Traditionally, much of dGe lugs education was controlled by [page 205] large monasteries near Lhasa, especially 'Bras spungs, Se ra and dGa' ldan.3 Each major monastic university comprised a number of colleges, each college having its own support personnel, its own temples, its own debate manuals, its own faculty, and its own abbot (mkhan po). Some colleges focused on tantric studies, while others existed only in theory or in vestigial forms; the major colleges that concern us here are sGo mang and Blo gsal gling at 'Bras spungs, sMad and Byes at Se ra, and Shar rtse and Byang rtse at dGa' ldan. While education was a major function of these institutions, at any given time most of the monks at the monastic universities were not students. Goldstein (24) reports, for example, that at the middle of this century the monks at the sMad college of Se ra monastery numbered 2,800; of these only 800 were students. Few of these students could expect to complete the entire monastic curriculum; most would find other vocations within the monastery. Thus, degree-holders were, and today remain, a small élite within the monastic community.

An education at a big monastery is not presumed necessary for spiritual development, but there is an implication that study at these monasteries represents a rare and invaluable spiritual opportunity for those who can withstand its rigors. Advancement through the curriculum and academic hierarchy of these institutions is presumed to reflect the attainment of (at least) the conceptual knowledge and analytical skills prerequisite to yogic realization. The colleges of 'Bras spungs, Se ra and dGa' ldan monasteries give the title dge bshes to scholars passing exams at the end of twenty to twenty-five years of study. The charismatic valence of this title is apparent when one considers that the Sanskrit equivalent of the title dge bshes—kalyāṇamitra, usually translated "spiritual friend"—is a standard epithet of a guru, i.e., a spiritual master.

Traditionally, considerable wealth and power accumulated in the hierarchies of these prestigious institutions; they played important religious, political, economic, and even military roles in the history of Tibet. Far-flung networks of affiliated monasteries not only provided a feeder system for promising students and appropriate sinecure for graduates, but also offered channels for political intercourse. The abbots of the major colleges were among the most important figures in Tibetan politics. Because the abbots were always selected from the ranks of the dge bshes, mastery of [page 206] the monastic syllabus—including expert knowledge of the debate manuals—was an important path "out of the ranks" into charismatic office and political power. While incarnate lamas (sprul sku) achieved their status otherwise, they were at least in principle expected to pass through the same educational system.

Intercollegiate solidarity within the large monasteries tends to be weak. Each functioning college has its own chapel ('du khang), staff, and debate manuals. As Goldstein (26-29) notes, when monks at Se ra Byes revolted against the central government in 1947, Se ra sMad did not help them; when 'Bras spungs Blo gsal gling quarrelled with the Dalai Lama in 1921, 'Bras spungs sGo mang did not take their side. A monk's strongest loyalties are to his college and his regional house (khang tshan), a sub-collegiate unit with membership traditionally based on natal province. Some colleges have traditional regional affiliations based on the provinces represented by their constituent houses; thus, rivalries between colleges within a monastery may have a regional flavor. Each college maintains the hagiographical tradition of its most important author and, to a certain extent, takes his assertions as orthodoxy. Rivalries still rage between contiguous colleges using different textbooks. At 'Bras spungs, doctrinal disputes between Blo gsal gling and sGo mang turn on differences so thin that one hesitates to call them "philosophical." Yet analytical debate of such differences plays an enormous role in the manuals and the lives of those who use them. In debate with other colleges (during the winter session and at sMon lam) each monk is expected to uphold, insofar as possible, the assertions of his college's manuals. Outside the context of debate with other colleges, dGe lugs monks differ greatly in their attitudes toward "debate manual orthodoxy." Many regard their teachers and manuals as sources of unassailable truth, using their definitions as absolute reference points. On the other hand, there are always those who "consider the knowledge imparted to them as a tool...accepted provisionally in order to advance" on a quest that is at once philosophical and spiritual (Dreyfus: 10-12).

The outline of the curriculum varies only slightly from college to college, and always includes five main phases (see also Onoda, in this volume):[page 207]

1. (1) study of logic, epistemology and psychology, based on Tibetan "Summarized Topics" (bsdus grwa) debate manuals deriving their content from Dharmakīrti's Pramānavārttika and other sources (three to six years)
2. (2) study of the bodhisattva path and related topics in Prajñāpāramitā (phar phyin) literature, based mainly on Maitreya's Abhisamayālaṃkāra, its Indian and Tibetan commentaries, and the related debate manuals (five to seven years)
3. (3) study of Mādhyamika (dbu ma) philosophy, based mainly on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, Tsong kha pa's dGongs pa rab gsal and Legs shes snying po, and the related debate manuals (four years\)
4. (4) study of Abhidharma, based especially on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa (mNgon par mdzod) and its commentaries (four years)
5. (5) study of monastic discipline (vinaya, 'dul ba), based especially on Guṇaprabha's Vinayasūtra and the associated debate manuals (four years)

Geshe Sopa (41-42) reports that the curriculum at the Byes college of Se ra includes three years for the first phase, five years for the second, and four years for each of the other three phases. At the sGo mang college of 'Bras spungs, six years are dedicated to the first phase and six or seven years to the second phase (Hopkins: 15; Klein: 220). Once a day classes meet with a teacher for about two hours of text-study; twice daily they meet in the courtyard for sessions of oral debate among students. Five or six weeks out of every year are set aside for an inter-monastic session of debate and study of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavarttika and related texts. Those who complete the five phases of the curriculum normally spend additional years reviewing and sharpening their debate skills before undergoing examination for the dge bshes degree at the Prayer Festival (sMon lam) celebrated during the first three weeks of the new year.

In this limited space we will mention some of the debate manuals used in the third (dbu ma) phase of this curriculum.

Many of the most important Mādhyamika debate manuals are sub-commentaries on Tsong kha pa's dGongs pa rab gsal, his commentary [page 208] on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra.4 These manuals also include relevant citations of sūtra and other Indian Mādhyamika texts, along with references to Tsong kha pa's Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho, Legs bshad snying po, Lam rim chen mo, and Lam rim 'bring, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po's sTong thun chen mo and rGyal tshab's sPyod 'jug rnam bshad. The authors of extant debate manuals on Madhyamaka include: Śānti pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan (fifteenth century), who wrote for the 'Khyil gang College of bKra shis lhun po Monastery; mKhas sgrub bsTan pa dar rgyas (1493-1568) and Grags pa bshad sgrub (1675-1748), authors for the sMad College of Se ra; rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546), author for the Byes college of Se ra and the Byang rtse College of dGa' ldan;5 sGom sde shar pa Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan (1532-1592), a student of rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan and an author for the Byes College of Se ra as well as the Byang rtse College of dGa' ldan; Khyung phrug Byams pa bkra shis (sixteenth century), another student of rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan and an author for the Byang rtse College of dGa' ldan; Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa (1478-1554), author for the Blo gsal gling College of 'Bras spungs and the Shar rtse College of dGa' ldan; and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson 'grus (1648-1721), author of the texts of the sGo mang College of 'Bras spungs as well as the bKra shis 'kyil Monastery, which he founded.6

Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa, rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa are the best known and most influential of the Mādhyamika debate manual authors. In their textbooks on Madhyamaka, these writers share two main goals: (1) to provide a basis for instruction in the fundamentals of Madhyamaka philosophy, and (2) to confirm the fundamental coherence of Tsong kha pa's system by refuting contrary interpretations and rebutting critics. Born in the same century during which Tsong kha pa and his immediate disciples died, and flourishing prior to the sect's attainment of political supremacy, rJe btsun pa and Paṇ chen see the founder and his early followers in the light of a charisma slightly less magnificent than that appreciated by later generations. Paṇ chen, in particular, boldly overthrows the assertions of mKhas grub and rGyal tshab when they conflict with his own conclusions (see BZSG: 61a and BJGL: 47a-47b). The work of rJe btsun pa and Paṇ chen seems quite terse when compared to 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's elaborate grappling with myriad doctrinal complications. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Mādhyamika manual is more [page 209] ambitious than others in its attempts (1) to demonstrate the fidelity of Tsong kha pa to his Indian sources and (2) to reconcile apparent contradictions among Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub, and rGyal tshab. Thriving in the heyday of dGe lugs power, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is also more deferential to Tsong kha pa's spiritual "sons" (sras)—mKhas grub and rGyal tshab. When he cannot reconcile a literal (tshig zin) reading of mKhas grub or rGyal tshab with his own understanding of Tsong kha pa, he works to reconcile the intentions (dgongs pa) behind their words.7

The following brief excerpt from 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Mādhyamika debate manual illustrates how instruction, polemic, and exegesis can be finely woven on the framework of the debate format. We find the author citing Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā and Madhyamakāvatāra in order to rebut attacks by Tsong kha pa's Sa skya pa critic, sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405). 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa attempts to show that sTag tshang, in his critique of the dGe lugs presentation of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) of conventional phenomena, adopts a position that Candrakīrti specifically refutes. At the same time, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa implicitly offers a solution to an exegetical problem in the Prasannapadā.

In his discussion of the term lokasaṃvṛti ('jig rten gyi kun rdzob; worldly conventionality" or "worldly concealer"), Candrakīrti (PP: 493) first seems to say that the word loka ("world") does not imply a contrasting aloka ("non-world"). Yet Candrakīrti then appears to reverse himself, writing (PP: 493), "Yet, in one way there is such a non-world. Those who have erroneous vision because their senses have been impaired by opthalmia, blue eye-film, jaundice, etc. are not worlds." Many scholars ignore or gloss over Candrakīrti's initial denial. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa thinks he can explain the intent of the initial denial, but he embeds his answer in a refutation of sTag tshang. A key feature of sTag tshang's presentation of conventionalities (saṃvṛti, kun rdzob) is the distinction between worldly conventionalities and yogic conventionalities (GTKN: 266). By citing Candrakīrti's denial of non-worldly conventionalities in refutation of sTag tshang, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa suggests that Candrakīrti's initial denial is intended to rule out a special category [page 210] of non-worldly, yogic conventionalities.

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa then uses a hypothetical objection as an opportunity to reconcile his reading of the Prasannapadā with earlier comments on the Madhyamakāvatāra. Confident that in a few brief strokes he has unravelled a passage in the Prasannapadā, aligned it with the Madhyamakāvatāra, and refuted sTag tshang, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa cannot resist concluding on a self-congratulatory note. He writes (BMC: 541-542):

Incorrect Position held by sTag tshang the Translator: [Candrakīrti's] use of the word loka ["world"] in the phrase lokasaṃvṛti ('jig rten gyi kun rdzob) precludes Superiors having in their continuums conventional valid cognitions (tha snyad pa'i tshad ma) that perceive conventional truths (saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa).8

Correct Response: It follows that this is incorrect because [Candrakirti's] statement of loka [in "lokasaṃvṛti"] is descriptive; it is not [made] for the sake of applying analyses such as [yours]. This is because Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (493) says:

Is there also a saṃvṛti that is not worldly from which a worldly saṃvṛti could be thus distinguished? This [word "worldly"] describes how things are. That analysis [which assumes that since saṃvṛti is sometimes modified by "worldly," there must also be an unworldly saṃvṛti] does not apply here.

 

Incorrect Position with regard to this: It [absurdly] follows that worldly conventionalities (lokasaṃvṛti, 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob) are not divided into conventionalities that are real for the world ('jig rten gyi yang dag pa'i kun rdzob) and conventionalities that are unreal for the world ('jig rten gyi log pa'i kun rdzob) because [according to you] "world" (loka, 'jig rten) is stated [merely] for descriptive purposes [and not in order to differentiate two types of conventionalities].9 If you accept the consequence, it follows that your explanation that in Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra (104) worldly conventionalities are of two types—those that are real from a worldly perspective and those that are unreal from a worldly perspective—is incorrect.

Correct Response: The original reason [—that "world" is stated for descriptive purposes in the Prasannapadā—] certainly does not entail the consequence [—that worldly conventionalities are not divided into conventionalities that are real for the world and conventionalities that are unreal for the world—] because, since the erroneous—i.e., false—consciousnesses of one whose sense powers have been impaired by jaundice, etc., are not the world in relation to whose perspective something is posited as [page 211] real, Candrakīrti says "worldly conventional truth" (lokasaṃvṛtisatya) in order to make that point understood.10 This is because Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (493.2-4) says:

Yet in one way there is [such a non-world]. Those who have erroneous vision because their senses have been impaired by opthalmia, blue eye-film,11 jaundice, etc. are not worlds. That which is a conventionality for them is not a worldly conventional truth (lokasaṃvṛtisatya).12 Therefore, a worldly conventional truth is distinguished from that.

 

Since it seems that even many former scholars did not explain13 this, I have written a little clearly.

From a dGe lugs religious perspective, debate manuals engender analytical skills and lay the foundations of right view, thus providing a solid conceptual basis from which yogic inquiry into the nature of reality can proceed. We may also observe that (1) minor differences among the manuals are focal points for the intellectual expression of collegial solidarity and intercollegiate tensions, while (2) their far broader commonalities in structure and content contribute to the socialization of the monastic élite within a shared worldview.

Candrakīrti

MAMadhyamakāvatāra. Tibetan translation: P no. 5261, vol. 98 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

PPMūlamadhyamakavṛttiprasannapadā. In Mūlamadhaymakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Ed. by Louis de la Vallée Poussin. Bibliotheca Buddhica4. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970. Tibetan: P no. 5260, vol. 98 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki); and Jacques May, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959.

Dharmakīrti

PVPramāṇavārttikakārika. In Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti. Ed. by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Tibetan: P no. 5709, vol. 130 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

Dreyfus, Georges B. J.

1987Definition in Buddhism. M.A. thesis. Charlottesville: University of Virgina.[page 214]

Goldstein, Melvyn C.

1989A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Grags pa bshad sgrub

BMYGdBu ma la 'jug pa'i dgongs pa yang gsal sgron me shes bya ba'i tshig 'grel spyi don mtha dpyod zung 'brel du bshad pa. New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1972.

Guṇaprabha

VSVinayasūtra. Tibetan translation: P no. 5619, vol. 123 in The Tibetan Tripitaka (see Suzuki).

Hopkins, Jeffrey

n.d.Reflections on Reality: The Nature of Phenomena in the Mind-Only School. Unpublished ms.

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson 'grus

BMCdBu ma chen mo/ dBu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs. In his Collected Works, vol. 9. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972. Also, Buxaduor: Gomang, 1967.

Khyung phrug Byams pa bkra shis

BMKNdBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' ba'i gnas gsal bar byed pa legs bshad skal bzang mgul rgyan. New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1974.

Klein, Anne

1986Knowledge and Liberation. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

Maitreya

AAAbhisamayālaṃkāra. In Abhisamayālaṃkāra-Prajñāpāramitā-Upadeśa-śastra. Ed. by Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller. Bibliotheca Buddhica22. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970. Tibetan: P no. 5184, vol. 88 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

mKhas sgrub bsTan pa dar rgyas

BMLGbsTan bcos chen po dbu ma la 'jug pa'i spyi don rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dgongs pa gsal bar byed pa'i blo gsal sgron me. New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1972.

GRTPrNam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi mtha dpyod rigs pa'i rgya mtsho blo gsal gyi' jug sgo. New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1972.

mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po

TTCsTong thun chen mo/ Zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed. Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, n.d.[page 215]

Newland, Guy

1984Compassion: A Tibetan Analysis. London: Wisdom.

1992The Two Truths. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa

BJGLdBu ma la 'jug pa'i brgal lan zab don yang gsal sgron me. In his Collected Works, vol. ja. Mundgod: Drebung Loseling Library Society, 1985.

BZSGdBu ma'i spyi don zab don gsal ba'i sgron me. In his Collected Works, vol. ja. Mundgod: Drebung Loseling Library Society, 1985.

Perdue, Daniel

1992Debate in Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan

BMPDbsTan bcos dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' gnad gsal bar byed pa'i spyi don legs bshad skal bzang mgul rgyan. New Delhi: LHa mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1973.

Roerich, George N., trans.

1979Blue Annals. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

sGom sde shar pa Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan

TZKNThal bzlog gi dka' bai gnas gtan la 'bebs pa. New Delhi: LHa mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1973.

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup

1983Lectures on Tibetan Religious Culture, vol. 1. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.

sTag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen

GTKNGrub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho. Thimphu: Kun bdzang stobs rgyal, 1976.

Suzuki, D.T., ed.

1956The Tibetan Tripiṭaka. Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation.

Śānti pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan

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LRCLam rim chen mo/ sKyes pa gsum gyi rnyams su blang ba'i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa. P no. 6001, vol. 152 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

LSNPLegs bshad snying po/ Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po. P no. 6142, vol. 153 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

RPGTRigs pa'i rgya mtsho/ dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya bai' rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho. P no. 6153, vol. 156 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

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GLZab mo stong pa nyid kyi lta ba la log rtog 'gog par byed pa'i bstan bcos lta ba ngan pa'i mun sel zhes bya ba bshes gnyen chen po go bo rab 'byams pa bsod nams seng ge ba la gdam pa. The work has been published in India under the abbreviated title lTa ngan mun sel, vol. 2. New Delhi: Champa Chogyal, 1969.

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SLZab mo stong pa nyid kyi lta ba la log rtog 'gog par byed pa'i bstan bcos lta ba ngan pa'i mun sel zhes bya ba bshes gnyen chen po shākya mchog ldan pa la gdams pa. The work has been published in India under the abbreviated title lTa ngan mun sel, vol. 1. New Delhi: Champa Chogyal, 1969.

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