Topics

In dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po's text, each Buddhist school is treated under four major topics, the last having numerous subdivisions:

Definition

Subschools

Etymology[page 177]

Assertions of tenets
1. Assertions on the basis
  1. Objects: the two truths, etc.
  2. Object-possessors (i.e., subjects)
    1. Persons
    2. Consciousnesses
    3. Terms
2. Assertions on the paths
  1. Objects of observation of the paths
  2. Objects abandoned by the paths
  3. Nature of the paths
3. Assertions on the fruits of the paths

First, for general orientation, a reader is given a definition of the school, its sub-schools, and an etymology of its name. Then the tenets of the school are introduced. The topics considered under the heading of "assertions of tenets" reveal the soteriological orientation of the inquiry. The assertions are divided into three categories—presentations of the basis, the paths, and the fruits of the path. The presentation of the basis refers to assertions on classes of phenomena, which provide the basis for practicing the spiritual paths, which, in turn, produce attainments, the fruits of the path. It is clear from this order that the reason for philosophical learning about phenomena is to enable practice of a path that can transform the mind from being mired in a condition of suffering to being enlightened in a state of freedom.

The general structure of basis, paths, and fruits probably takes its lead from the emphasis in texts of the Mādhyamika School on three coordinated sets of twos:

(1) the two truths—conventional and ultimate—which are the basis

(2) the two practices—method and wisdom—which are the paths

(3) the two Buddha Bodies—Form Bodies and Truth Body— which are the final fruits of the path.

According to the Great Vehicle as described in these texts, taking as one's basis conventional truths, one practices the paths of method—love, compassion, and the altruistic intention to become enlightened as well the compassionate deeds that these induce—in dependence upon which one achieves the fruit of the Form Bodies [page 178] of a buddha. Also, taking as one's basis ultimate truths, one practices the paths of wisdom—especially the realization of the final status of persons and phenomena, their emptiness of inherent existence—in dependence upon which one achieves the fruit of a Truth Body of a buddha. This threefold format of basis, path, and fruit that finds its main expression in the Great Vehicle seems to have supplied the structure for the genre of presentations of tenets for both the Lesser Vehicle7 and the Great Vehicle.

Objects. Within the section on the basis, the emphasis on the two truths in all four schools derives from the fact that the two truths are a prime subject in the tenets of what is considered to be the highest school, the Mādhyamika. As Gung thang dKon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me (1762-1823),8 who was the chief student of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, says, the prime way that the Vaibhāṣika school and the Sautrāntika school delineate the meaning of the scriptures is by way of the Four Noble Truths, whereas the Cittamātra school accomplishes this through the doctrine of the three natures and the Mādhyamika school through the doctrine of the two truths (see DN: 80, 235). Thus, the emphasis given in this presentation of tenets to the four schools' delineations of the two truths derives from the system that the author and his tradition have determined to be the highest, the Mādhyamika school. This is not to say that the two truths are not important topics in all four schools, for they are; rather, the two truths are not the central topic in the other schools in the way that they are in the Mādhyamika school.

Object-Possessors. Having presented a school's assertions on objects, the text considers object-possessors, or subjects. Object-possessors are treated as being of three types—persons (since they possess objects), consciousnesses (since they are aware of objects), and terms (since they refer to objects).

One might wonder why there is a section on persons if Buddhist schools advocate a view of selflessness. In this Tibetan delineation of Indian schools of Buddhism, the term "self" in "selflessness" refers not to persons but to an over-reified status of phenomena, be these persons or other phenomena. Consequently, even though it is said that in general "self" (ātman, bdag), "person" (pudgala, gang zag), and "I" (aham, nga) are coextensive, in the particular context of the selflessness of persons "self" and "person" are not at all coextensive and do not at all have the same meaning.[page 179] In the term "selflessness of persons," "self" refers to a falsely imagined status that needs to be refuted, and "persons" refers to existent beings who are the basis with respect to which that refutation is made. All of these schools, therefore, believe that persons exist. They do not claim that persons are mere creations of ignorance.

A question between the schools concerns the nature of the person. According to dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po and his dGe lugs pa predecessors, all schools except the Mādhyamika Prāsaṅgika posit something from within the bases of designation of a person as being the person. In contrast, the Prāsaṅgika school holds that even though a person is designated in dependence upon mind and body, the person is neither mind nor body, being just the I that is designated in dependence upon mind and body. Following the lead of Candrakīrti, recognized by most as the founder of the Prāsaṅgika school, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po identifies how in the other schools some factor among the five aggregates (forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses) is considered to be the person when sought analytically. The Vaibhāṣikas, in general, are said to hold that the mere collection of the mental and physical aggregates is the person, whereas some of the five Saṃmitīya subschools are said to maintain that all five aggregates are the person—dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po's suggestion being that, for them, each of the five aggregates is the person (although the absurdity of one person being five persons would seem difficult not to notice). Another subschool, the Avantaka, is said to assert that the mind alone is the person.

Similarly, in the Sautrāntika school, the Followers of Scripture are said to assert that the continuum of the aggregates is the person, whereas the Followers of Reasoning are said to maintain that the mental consciousness is the person. In the Cittamātra school, the Followers of Scripture hold that the mind-basis-of-all (ālayavijñāna, kun gzhi rnam par shes pa) is the person, whereas the Followers of Reasoning assert that the mental consciousness is. Again, in the Autonomy school, both Yogic Autonomists and Sūtra Autonomists are said to assert that a subtle, neutral mental consciousness is what is found to be the person when it is searched for among its bases of designation.

For the most part, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po's delineation of what these schools assert to be the person is a matter of conjecture and not a reporting of forthright statements of these [page 180] schools' own texts. Though it is clear that most of these schools (if not all) accept that persons exist, it is by no means clear in their own literature that they assert that something from within the bases of designation of a person is the person. Rather, it would seem that, as presented in Vasubandhu's commentary on the ninth chapter of his Abhidharmakośa,9 persons are merely asserted to be non-associated compositional factors (viprayuktasaṃskāra, ldan min 'du byed) and thus an instance of the fourth aggregate, compositional factors, without a specific identification of any of the five aggregates that are a person's bases of designation as the person. For instance, one could quite safely say that there is not a single line in the whole of Indian Cittamātra literature that explicitly asserts that the mind-basis-of-all is the person. Rather, such an assertion is deduced from the fact that Cittamātrins Following Scripture (that is to say, the followers of Asaṅga) assert that the mind-basis-of-all travels from lifetime to lifetime carrying with it the karmic predispositions established by earlier actions. Bhāvaviveka, on the other hand, seems openly to assert that the mental consciousness is the person, when, in response to a challenge, he says that if the opponent is attempting to establish for him that consciousness is the person, he is proving what is already established for him (see Hopkins, 1983: 695-696). In any case, the emphasis of the dGe lugs pa treatises on identifying, for each of these schools, what, from among the five aggregates, the person is comes from their acceptance of Candrakīrti's claim to a unique assertion that nothing from among them is the person.

Thus, it can be seen that the very structure (basis, paths, and fruits) and the choice of topics (such as the two truths and assertions on the person) do not altogether arise from prime concerns within each school, but are brought over from focal issues in other schools, particularly those considered to be higher. That topics of prime concern in the "higher" schools dominate to some extent the presentation of the tenets of all four schools is natural, given that the main aim is to draw readers into realizing the impact of the views of the "higher" systems. This genre never seeks to give isolated presentations of these schools' views or a predominantly historical account.

Consciousnesses. The main focus of the tenets concerning consciousness is to identify the different types of minds in terms of misapprehension and correct apprehension. The purpose is to provide a psychological structure for the therapeutic paths that cause [page 181] a person to proceed gradually from misconceived notions about the nature of persons and other phenomena to states of mind that can counteract innate misconceptions. The liberative directionality of the overall enterprise informs the course of the discussion, the main interest being to separate correctly perceiving from improperly perceiving consciousnesses and to identify the difference between conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses. The latter, when they realize selflessness, are considered to be more powerful for overcoming obstructions to liberation and to full enlightenment.

The topics of consciousness are presented in their richest detail in the chapter on the Sautrāntika school, specifically the Sautrāntika Following Reasoning; correspondingly, the topic of terms is discussed most fully in the chapter on the Vaibhāṣika school. Thus, in many respects such books are to be read cumulatively, bringing over to another system those assertions that, although they come from a different system, are concordant with its outlook. The book does not always make clear what is to be carried over and what is not; such information is, however, supplied by the oral tradition, i.e., by a competent teacher.

Paths. Having presented a general outline of phenomena, the basis, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po presents the various schools' tenets on the spiritual paths which are founded on their respective assertions about the basis. The paths are described in terms of (1) the main objects of meditation, (2) the main misconceptions that are abandoned through such meditation, and (3) the layout of the paths.

In all four schools, paths are presented for hearers (śrāvaka, nyan thos), solitary realizers (pratyekabuddha, rang rgyal), and bodhisattvas. It might seem, at first reading, to be surprising that even the Lesser Vehicle schools—the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools—should have paths for bodhisattvas, since bodhisattvas are associated primarily with the Great Vehicle. However, a distinction is made between philosophical schools, which are divided into Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle, and practitioners of paths, which also are divided into Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle. The philosophical schools are divided in this way according to whether they present a selflessness of phenomena (Great Vehicle) or whether they do not (Lesser Vehicle). Since the Great Vehicle tenet systems—the Cittamātra and Mādhyamika schools—present a selflessness of phenomena in addition to a selflessness of persons, [page 182] they also speak of "obstructions to omniscience" (jñeyāvaraṇa, shes sgrib), these being what prevent simultaneous and direct cognition of all phenomena as well as their final nature. The Lesser Vehicle schools, on the other hand, make no such claims even though they present buddhahood as having an omniscience which can serially know anything, but not simultaneously.10

Even though the Lesser Vehicle schools—the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools—do not present a path leading to simultaneous and direct knowledge of all phenomena, they do speak of the path of a bodhisattva proceeding to buddhahood when they relate how Śākyamuni Buddha, for instance, became enlightened. Similarly, the Great Vehicle schools—Cittamātra and Mādhyamika—speak, not just about how bodhisattvas proceed on the path but also about how hearers and solitary realizers, who are Lesser Vehicle practitioners, proceed on the path. In the latter case, the Great Vehicle schools are not reporting how the Lesser Vehicle schools present the path, but how the Great Vehicle schools themselves present the path for those beings—hearers and solitary realizers—whose prime motivation, unlike that of bodhisattvas, is, for the time being, not the welfare of others but their own liberation from cyclic existence. Therefore, it is said to be possible for someone who is, for instance, a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika doctrinally to be a Lesser Vehicle practitioner by motivation, in that the person has decided for the time being to pursue his or her own liberation first before becoming primarily dedicated to the welfare of others. Also, it is possible for someone who is, for instance, a Vaibhāṣika to be a Great Vehicle practitioner in terms of motivation, having become dedicated to achieving the enlightenment of a buddha in order to be of service to all beings.

Fruits of the Paths. The three types of paths—hearer, solitary realizer, and bodhisattva—have different results or fruits. The first two lead to liberation from cyclic existence, whereas the last leads to buddhahood, a state free from both the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence and from the obstructions to the omniscience of a buddha, as described in the respective systems.