Debate Manuals (Yig cha) in dGe lugs Monastic Colleges

Debate Manuals (Yig cha) in dGe lugs Monastic Colleges
by Guy Newland
From Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre, pp. 202-216.
Reproduced with permission from the author
under the THL Digital Text License.

Overview

[page 202] Yig cha are the required textbooks in the curriculum of Tibetan Buddhist monastic colleges (grwa tshang). They may be called "debate manuals" because they are often structured around a series of debates which provide rich fodder for the oral debates characteristic of Tibetan monastic education. The word yig cha literally means "record" or "notes." Debate manuals have value both as explicit doctrinal records of the evolution of Buddhist thought and as implicit social records of attitudes among educated monks toward faith, reason, education, and tradition. The genre can be traced back almost a millennium, with new works still appearing in this century.

Often composed by distinguished scholars at the invitation of their colleges, many debate manuals are actually Tibetan sub-sub-commentaries pertaining to Indian Buddhist treatises (śāstras) such as Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, Maitreya's Abhisamayālaṃkāra, and Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra. Thus, while debate manuals are by definition pedagogical works, intended to inform and to stimulate debate, the most noteworthy examples of the genre also involve elements of creative exegesis, polemic, and/or philosophical synthesis. If we believe that earlier formulations of a religious view are somehow more pure or more authentic—and therefore more worthy of academic concern—then we may dismiss debate manuals, along with Tibetan doxography (grub mtha') and [page 203] "grounds and paths" (sa lam) literature, as derivative, synthetic, post-classical scholasticism. However, if our interest is the life of Buddhist philosophy across generations of Tibetan scholars, and if we seek to know not just where tradition began but how it is remembered (and thus reshaped), then we must give debate manuals their due.

In the monastic colleges of the dGe lugs school debate manuals have been the primary focus of intellectual life for the last five or six centuries. This is certainly not to depreciate the enormous importance of Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357-1419) as the preeminent scholar and revered founder of the order, nor to imply a lack of reverence for Śākyamuni and the authors of the Mahāyāna treatises. Tibetan scholars do rely upon debate manuals for exegetical guidance through the "great books" of their tradition. The present Dalai Lama has reminded monks that they should not neglect to study Tsong kha pa's own writings. Yet the issuance of such a reminder, unnecessary for the best scholars, is indicative of the typical student's tendency to acquire Tsong kha pa's system in a secondhand way, relying heavily on the convenient and precise formulations of the debate manuals. Insofar as the colleges traditionally regard their manuals as ideal reformulations of the essential points of the treatises and commentaries, the focus on the manuals has tended to displace scholastic attention to the "great books."1

Monastic debate manuals bridge both historical and stylistic gaps by explicating the content of classical treatises in language patterned after and readily (re)assimilated to the scholastic oral debate tradition. Debate manuals, or substantial portions from them, are memorized by students and serve as the basis for (1) commentary by the teacher during class, and (2) debate among the students in the monastery courtyard after class. Thus, these manuals link the philosophy of the classical treatises to the living philosophy of courtyard debate, creating a shared universe for discourse among teachers and students of the same college. In Tibetan monastic debate, arguments must be framed as syllogisms (prayoga, sbyor ba) or consequences (prasaṅga, thal 'gyur), and the respondent must either challenge the sign (liṅga, rtags) (i.e., the minor premise), or the pervasion (vyāpti, khyab pa) (i.e., the major premise), or else accept the opponent's point. The same rules structure the debates in the manuals. Most manuals break down the [page 204] material into a series of topics, covering each topic in a tripartite schema: (1) debates refuting opposing systems (dgag pa), (2) a presentation of the author's own system (rang lugs bzhag pa) of definitions (mtshan nyid), etc., and (3) further debates dispelling objections (rtsod spong) posed by actual or hypothetical critics. This format allows authors to sharpen their arguments while creating text that their debate-trained readers find relatively easy to memorize for use in the courtyard. Conversely, debate manual authors must have derived some of their written debates from oral debates current in their respective colleges and generations.

Monastic Colleges

Goldstein (21) estimates that twenty-six percent of traditional Tibet's male population were monks. Although Tibetans generally regard monks as superior to laymen, this high percentage is one reason that the official charisma of the robes was not potent enough to mark monks as an exclusive élite. In the dGe lugs, the dominant order of Tibetan Buddhism since the seventeenth century, scholarly achievement has been one of the most important paths into the élite circles of leadership. To understand this fact, we must reflect on the relationship between reason and liberation in Tsong kha pa's philosophy.

Like other Buddhists, Tsong kha pa and his dGe lugs pa followers contend that liberation from beginningless cycles of suffering is reached through non-dualistic (advaya, gnyis med) and trans-conceptual insight (nirvikalpajñāna, rtog med ye shes) into reality (dharmatā, chos nyid). However, for the dGe lugs pa this insight is not a spontaneous, naturally arising, objectless intuition. Rather it is something that must be gradually and systematically cultivated, and it has a specific, rationally comprehensible object—emptiness (śūnyatā, stong pa nyid). Although emptiness is the very nature of the mind, realization (rtogs pa) of this natural emptiness is a hard-won accomplishment. Realization of emptiness depends not only upon prior training in ethics, but upon conceptual mastery of what "emptiness" is and how logic can be used to approach it.

This philosophical stance reinforced the religious and political authority of those who controlled educational institutions equipped to provide the requisite training in logic and philosophy.2 Traditionally, much of dGe lugs education was controlled by [page 205] large monasteries near Lhasa, especially 'Bras spungs, Se ra and dGa' ldan.3 Each major monastic university comprised a number of colleges, each college having its own support personnel, its own temples, its own debate manuals, its own faculty, and its own abbot (mkhan po). Some colleges focused on tantric studies, while others existed only in theory or in vestigial forms; the major colleges that concern us here are sGo mang and Blo gsal gling at 'Bras spungs, sMad and Byes at Se ra, and Shar rtse and Byang rtse at dGa' ldan. While education was a major function of these institutions, at any given time most of the monks at the monastic universities were not students. Goldstein (24) reports, for example, that at the middle of this century the monks at the sMad college of Se ra monastery numbered 2,800; of these only 800 were students. Few of these students could expect to complete the entire monastic curriculum; most would find other vocations within the monastery. Thus, degree-holders were, and today remain, a small élite within the monastic community.

An education at a big monastery is not presumed necessary for spiritual development, but there is an implication that study at these monasteries represents a rare and invaluable spiritual opportunity for those who can withstand its rigors. Advancement through the curriculum and academic hierarchy of these institutions is presumed to reflect the attainment of (at least) the conceptual knowledge and analytical skills prerequisite to yogic realization. The colleges of 'Bras spungs, Se ra and dGa' ldan monasteries give the title dge bshes to scholars passing exams at the end of twenty to twenty-five years of study. The charismatic valence of this title is apparent when one considers that the Sanskrit equivalent of the title dge bsheskalyāṇamitra, usually translated "spiritual friend"—is a standard epithet of a guru, i.e., a spiritual master.

Traditionally, considerable wealth and power accumulated in the hierarchies of these prestigious institutions; they played important religious, political, economic, and even military roles in the history of Tibet. Far-flung networks of affiliated monasteries not only provided a feeder system for promising students and appropriate sinecure for graduates, but also offered channels for political intercourse. The abbots of the major colleges were among the most important figures in Tibetan politics. Because the abbots were always selected from the ranks of the dge bshes, mastery of [page 206] the monastic syllabus—including expert knowledge of the debate manuals—was an important path "out of the ranks" into charismatic office and political power. While incarnate lamas (sprul sku) achieved their status otherwise, they were at least in principle expected to pass through the same educational system.

Intercollegiate solidarity within the large monasteries tends to be weak. Each functioning college has its own chapel ('du khang), staff, and debate manuals. As Goldstein (26-29) notes, when monks at Se ra Byes revolted against the central government in 1947, Se ra sMad did not help them; when 'Bras spungs Blo gsal gling quarrelled with the Dalai Lama in 1921, 'Bras spungs sGo mang did not take their side. A monk's strongest loyalties are to his college and his regional house (khang tshan), a sub-collegiate unit with membership traditionally based on natal province. Some colleges have traditional regional affiliations based on the provinces represented by their constituent houses; thus, rivalries between colleges within a monastery may have a regional flavor. Each college maintains the hagiographical tradition of its most important author and, to a certain extent, takes his assertions as orthodoxy. Rivalries still rage between contiguous colleges using different textbooks. At 'Bras spungs, doctrinal disputes between Blo gsal gling and sGo mang turn on differences so thin that one hesitates to call them "philosophical." Yet analytical debate of such differences plays an enormous role in the manuals and the lives of those who use them. In debate with other colleges (during the winter session and at sMon lam) each monk is expected to uphold, insofar as possible, the assertions of his college's manuals. Outside the context of debate with other colleges, dGe lugs monks differ greatly in their attitudes toward "debate manual orthodoxy." Many regard their teachers and manuals as sources of unassailable truth, using their definitions as absolute reference points. On the other hand, there are always those who "consider the knowledge imparted to them as a tool...accepted provisionally in order to advance" on a quest that is at once philosophical and spiritual (Dreyfus: 10-12).

The dGe lugs Curriculum

The outline of the curriculum varies only slightly from college to college, and always includes five main phases (see also Onoda, in this volume):[page 207]

  1. (1) study of logic, epistemology and psychology, based on Tibetan "Summarized Topics" (bsdus grwa) debate manuals deriving their content from Dharmakīrti's Pramānavārttika and other sources (three to six years)
  2. (2) study of the bodhisattva path and related topics in Prajñāpāramitā (phar phyin) literature, based mainly on Maitreya's Abhisamayālaṃkāra, its Indian and Tibetan commentaries, and the related debate manuals (five to seven years)
  3. (3) study of Mādhyamika (dbu ma) philosophy, based mainly on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, Tsong kha pa's dGongs pa rab gsal and Legs shes snying po, and the related debate manuals (four years\)
  4. (4) study of Abhidharma, based especially on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa (mNgon par mdzod) and its commentaries (four years)
  5. (5) study of monastic discipline (vinaya, 'dul ba), based especially on Guṇaprabha's Vinayasūtra and the associated debate manuals (four years)

Geshe Sopa (41-42) reports that the curriculum at the Byes college of Se ra includes three years for the first phase, five years for the second, and four years for each of the other three phases. At the sGo mang college of 'Bras spungs, six years are dedicated to the first phase and six or seven years to the second phase (Hopkins: 15; Klein: 220). Once a day classes meet with a teacher for about two hours of text-study; twice daily they meet in the courtyard for sessions of oral debate among students. Five or six weeks out of every year are set aside for an inter-monastic session of debate and study of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavarttika and related texts. Those who complete the five phases of the curriculum normally spend additional years reviewing and sharpening their debate skills before undergoing examination for the dge bshes degree at the Prayer Festival (sMon lam) celebrated during the first three weeks of the new year.

In this limited space we will mention some of the debate manuals used in the third (dbu ma) phase of this curriculum.

Mādhyamika Debate Manuals

Many of the most important Mādhyamika debate manuals are sub-commentaries on Tsong kha pa's dGongs pa rab gsal, his commentary [page 208] on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra.4 These manuals also include relevant citations of sūtra and other Indian Mādhyamika texts, along with references to Tsong kha pa's Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho, Legs bshad snying po, Lam rim chen mo, and Lam rim 'bring, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po's sTong thun chen mo and rGyal tshab's sPyod 'jug rnam bshad. The authors of extant debate manuals on Madhyamaka include: Śānti pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan (fifteenth century), who wrote for the 'Khyil gang College of bKra shis lhun po Monastery; mKhas sgrub bsTan pa dar rgyas (1493-1568) and Grags pa bshad sgrub (1675-1748), authors for the sMad College of Se ra; rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546), author for the Byes college of Se ra and the Byang rtse College of dGa' ldan;5 sGom sde shar pa Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan (1532-1592), a student of rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan and an author for the Byes College of Se ra as well as the Byang rtse College of dGa' ldan; Khyung phrug Byams pa bkra shis (sixteenth century), another student of rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan and an author for the Byang rtse College of dGa' ldan; Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa (1478-1554), author for the Blo gsal gling College of 'Bras spungs and the Shar rtse College of dGa' ldan; and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson 'grus (1648-1721), author of the texts of the sGo mang College of 'Bras spungs as well as the bKra shis 'kyil Monastery, which he founded.6

Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa, rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa are the best known and most influential of the Mādhyamika debate manual authors. In their textbooks on Madhyamaka, these writers share two main goals: (1) to provide a basis for instruction in the fundamentals of Madhyamaka philosophy, and (2) to confirm the fundamental coherence of Tsong kha pa's system by refuting contrary interpretations and rebutting critics. Born in the same century during which Tsong kha pa and his immediate disciples died, and flourishing prior to the sect's attainment of political supremacy, rJe btsun pa and Paṇ chen see the founder and his early followers in the light of a charisma slightly less magnificent than that appreciated by later generations. Paṇ chen, in particular, boldly overthrows the assertions of mKhas grub and rGyal tshab when they conflict with his own conclusions (see BZSG: 61a and BJGL: 47a-47b). The work of rJe btsun pa and Paṇ chen seems quite terse when compared to 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's elaborate grappling with myriad doctrinal complications. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Mādhyamika manual is more [page 209] ambitious than others in its attempts (1) to demonstrate the fidelity of Tsong kha pa to his Indian sources and (2) to reconcile apparent contradictions among Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub, and rGyal tshab. Thriving in the heyday of dGe lugs power, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is also more deferential to Tsong kha pa's spiritual "sons" (sras)—mKhas grub and rGyal tshab. When he cannot reconcile a literal (tshig zin) reading of mKhas grub or rGyal tshab with his own understanding of Tsong kha pa, he works to reconcile the intentions (dgongs pa) behind their words.7

Excerpt from 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's dBu ma chen mo

The following brief excerpt from 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Mādhyamika debate manual illustrates how instruction, polemic, and exegesis can be finely woven on the framework of the debate format. We find the author citing Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā and Madhyamakāvatāra in order to rebut attacks by Tsong kha pa's Sa skya pa critic, sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405). 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa attempts to show that sTag tshang, in his critique of the dGe lugs presentation of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) of conventional phenomena, adopts a position that Candrakīrti specifically refutes. At the same time, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa implicitly offers a solution to an exegetical problem in the Prasannapadā.

In his discussion of the term lokasaṃvṛti ('jig rten gyi kun rdzob; worldly conventionality" or "worldly concealer"), Candrakīrti (PP: 493) first seems to say that the word loka ("world") does not imply a contrasting aloka ("non-world"). Yet Candrakīrti then appears to reverse himself, writing (PP: 493), "Yet, in one way there is such a non-world. Those who have erroneous vision because their senses have been impaired by opthalmia, blue eye-film, jaundice, etc. are not worlds." Many scholars ignore or gloss over Candrakīrti's initial denial. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa thinks he can explain the intent of the initial denial, but he embeds his answer in a refutation of sTag tshang. A key feature of sTag tshang's presentation of conventionalities (saṃvṛti, kun rdzob) is the distinction between worldly conventionalities and yogic conventionalities (GTKN: 266). By citing Candrakīrti's denial of non-worldly conventionalities in refutation of sTag tshang, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa suggests that Candrakīrti's initial denial is intended to rule out a special category [page 210] of non-worldly, yogic conventionalities.

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa then uses a hypothetical objection as an opportunity to reconcile his reading of the Prasannapadā with earlier comments on the Madhyamakāvatāra. Confident that in a few brief strokes he has unravelled a passage in the Prasannapadā, aligned it with the Madhyamakāvatāra, and refuted sTag tshang, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa cannot resist concluding on a self-congratulatory note. He writes (BMC: 541-542):

Incorrect Position held by sTag tshang the Translator: [Candrakīrti's] use of the word loka ["world"] in the phrase lokasaṃvṛti ('jig rten gyi kun rdzob) precludes Superiors having in their continuums conventional valid cognitions (tha snyad pa'i tshad ma) that perceive conventional truths (saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa).8

Correct Response: It follows that this is incorrect because [Candrakirti's] statement of loka [in "lokasaṃvṛti"] is descriptive; it is not [made] for the sake of applying analyses such as [yours]. This is because Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (493) says:

Is there also a saṃvṛti that is not worldly from which a worldly saṃvṛti could be thus distinguished? This [word "worldly"] describes how things are. That analysis [which assumes that since saṃvṛti is sometimes modified by "worldly," there must also be an unworldly saṃvṛti] does not apply here.

 

Incorrect Position with regard to this: It [absurdly] follows that worldly conventionalities (lokasaṃvṛti, 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob) are not divided into conventionalities that are real for the world ('jig rten gyi yang dag pa'i kun rdzob) and conventionalities that are unreal for the world ('jig rten gyi log pa'i kun rdzob) because [according to you] "world" (loka, 'jig rten) is stated [merely] for descriptive purposes [and not in order to differentiate two types of conventionalities].9 If you accept the consequence, it follows that your explanation that in Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra (104) worldly conventionalities are of two types—those that are real from a worldly perspective and those that are unreal from a worldly perspective—is incorrect.

Correct Response: The original reason [—that "world" is stated for descriptive purposes in the Prasannapadā—] certainly does not entail the consequence [—that worldly conventionalities are not divided into conventionalities that are real for the world and conventionalities that are unreal for the world—] because, since the erroneous—i.e., false—consciousnesses of one whose sense powers have been impaired by jaundice, etc., are not the world in relation to whose perspective something is posited as [page 211] real, Candrakīrti says "worldly conventional truth" (lokasaṃvṛtisatya) in order to make that point understood.10 This is because Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (493.2-4) says:

Yet in one way there is [such a non-world]. Those who have erroneous vision because their senses have been impaired by opthalmia, blue eye-film,11 jaundice, etc. are not worlds. That which is a conventionality for them is not a worldly conventional truth (lokasaṃvṛtisatya).12 Therefore, a worldly conventional truth is distinguished from that.

 

Since it seems that even many former scholars did not explain13 this, I have written a little clearly.

Conclusion

From a dGe lugs religious perspective, debate manuals engender analytical skills and lay the foundations of right view, thus providing a solid conceptual basis from which yogic inquiry into the nature of reality can proceed. We may also observe that (1) minor differences among the manuals are focal points for the intellectual expression of collegial solidarity and intercollegiate tensions, while (2) their far broader commonalities in structure and content contribute to the socialization of the monastic élite within a shared worldview.

 

References

Candrakīrti

MAMadhyamakāvatāra. Tibetan translation: P no. 5261, vol. 98 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

PPMūlamadhyamakavṛttiprasannapadā. In Mūlamadhaymakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Ed. by Louis de la Vallée Poussin. Bibliotheca Buddhica4. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970. Tibetan: P no. 5260, vol. 98 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki); and Jacques May, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959.

Dharmakīrti

PVPramāṇavārttikakārika. In Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti. Ed. by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Tibetan: P no. 5709, vol. 130 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

Dreyfus, Georges B. J.

1987Definition in Buddhism. M.A. thesis. Charlottesville: University of Virgina.[page 214]

Goldstein, Melvyn C.

1989A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Grags pa bshad sgrub

BMYGdBu ma la 'jug pa'i dgongs pa yang gsal sgron me shes bya ba'i tshig 'grel spyi don mtha dpyod zung 'brel du bshad pa. New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1972.

Guṇaprabha

VSVinayasūtra. Tibetan translation: P no. 5619, vol. 123 in The Tibetan Tripitaka (see Suzuki).

Hopkins, Jeffrey

n.d.Reflections on Reality: The Nature of Phenomena in the Mind-Only School. Unpublished ms.

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson 'grus

BMCdBu ma chen mo/ dBu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs. In his Collected Works, vol. 9. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972. Also, Buxaduor: Gomang, 1967.

Khyung phrug Byams pa bkra shis

BMKNdBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' ba'i gnas gsal bar byed pa legs bshad skal bzang mgul rgyan. New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1974.

Klein, Anne

1986Knowledge and Liberation. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

Maitreya

AAAbhisamayālaṃkāra. In Abhisamayālaṃkāra-Prajñāpāramitā-Upadeśa-śastra. Ed. by Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller. Bibliotheca Buddhica22. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970. Tibetan: P no. 5184, vol. 88 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

mKhas sgrub bsTan pa dar rgyas

BMLGbsTan bcos chen po dbu ma la 'jug pa'i spyi don rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dgongs pa gsal bar byed pa'i blo gsal sgron me. New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1972.

GRTPrNam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi mtha dpyod rigs pa'i rgya mtsho blo gsal gyi' jug sgo. New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1972.

mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po

TTCsTong thun chen mo/ Zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed. Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, n.d.[page 215]

Newland, Guy

1984Compassion: A Tibetan Analysis. London: Wisdom.

1992The Two Truths. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa

BJGLdBu ma la 'jug pa'i brgal lan zab don yang gsal sgron me. In his Collected Works, vol. ja. Mundgod: Drebung Loseling Library Society, 1985.

BZSGdBu ma'i spyi don zab don gsal ba'i sgron me. In his Collected Works, vol. ja. Mundgod: Drebung Loseling Library Society, 1985.

Perdue, Daniel

1992Debate in Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca: Snow Lion.

rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan

BMPDbsTan bcos dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' gnad gsal bar byed pa'i spyi don legs bshad skal bzang mgul rgyan. New Delhi: LHa mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1973.

Roerich, George N., trans.

1979Blue Annals. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

sGom sde shar pa Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan

TZKNThal bzlog gi dka' bai gnas gtan la 'bebs pa. New Delhi: LHa mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1973.

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup

1983Lectures on Tibetan Religious Culture, vol. 1. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.

sTag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen

GTKNGrub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho. Thimphu: Kun bdzang stobs rgyal, 1976.

Suzuki, D.T., ed.

1956The Tibetan Tripiṭaka. Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation.

Śānti pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan

GRKNrNam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' ba'i gnad gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos dbang gi rgyal po. New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1973.

Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa

GPRSdGongs pa rab gsal/ dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal. P no. 6143, vol. 154 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).[page 216]

LRBLam rim 'bring/ Byang chub lam gyi rim pa chung ba. P no. 6002, vols. 152-153 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

LRCLam rim chen mo/ sKyes pa gsum gyi rnyams su blang ba'i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa. P no. 6001, vol. 152 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

LSNPLegs bshad snying po/ Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po. P no. 6142, vol. 153 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

RPGTRigs pa'i rgya mtsho/ dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya bai' rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho. P no. 6153, vol. 156 in The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (see Suzuki).

Notes

[1] This situation is not peculiar to dGe lugs. In the colleges of the Sa skya school (and in the Sa skya College now located in Rajpur, India) the primary focus is on the work of Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge (1429-1489) rather than on the work of Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251/2) and the other early luminaries of the order. The Sa skya pa monks use the word yig cha to refer to the required texts by Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge.

[2] The following paragraphs describe the general situation in the monastic universities, considering both the traditional context (pre-1959) and the contemporary context of the dGe lugs monasteries reestablished in exile near Mundgod and Bylakuppe, India.

[3] Tsong kha pa established dGa' ldan in 1409; his student Byams chen chos rje founded 'Bras spungs in 1416 and Se ra (spelled Se rwa by some authorities) in 1419. Each held several thousand monks. Other major dGe lugs monastic universities include bKra shis lhun po, bKra shis 'kyil, and sKu 'bum. [page 212] Established in 1445 in gZhis ga rtse by dGe 'dun grub pa (who was posthumously entitled "First Dalai Lama"), bKra shis lhun po became the seat of the Paṇ chen Lama in the seventeenth century. bKra shis 'kyil was founded in eastern Tibet by the dGe lugs scholar 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson 'grus, and sKu 'bum was founded in the sixteenth century at Tsong kha pa's birthplace.

[4] There is also a class of Mādhyamika debate manuals based on Tsong kha pa's Legs bshad snying po. Many of the authors are the same as those mentioned in this paragraph.

[5] An excerpt from rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's debate manual on Madhyamaka is translated and explicated in Newland, 1984.

[6] No longer extant are Mādhyamika debate manuals by Blo gros rin chen seng ge (fifteenth century) and Shes rab dbang po (fifteenth century?), both formerly used in the Byes College of Se ra. My translation of the satyadvaya section from 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Mādhyamika debate manual is forthcoming from Snow Lion.

[7] For examples, see BMC: 268b, 275b, and 290a. In the section dealing with the two truths, we find mKhas grub quoted eight times in eighty-six sides. By comparison, Nāgārjuna is also cited eight times; only Tsong kha pa, Candrakīrti, and sūtra are cited more often. rGyal tshab is cited four times.

[8]

The Sa skya scholar sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen criticizes the dGe lugs position on conventional valid cognition (tha snyad pa'i tshad ma). He writes (GTKN: 269):

[T]he presentation of valid cognition that is well known in the world ... [may be] asserted in a way that indulges the perspective of the world. However, a so-called "valid cognizer comprehending conventionalities" is completely non-existent [not only in terms of the thorough analysis into emptiness but even] in terms of the normal analysis of our own system.

Thus, even Superiors in states subsequent to meditative equipoise (prṣṭhalabdhajñāna) cannot have valid knowledge of conventional phenomena. Nevertheless, their "yogic" mode of apprehension is distinct from the non-analytical perspective of the world. sTag tshang (GTKN: 266) uses this distinction to make a twofold division of conventionalities:

In general, it is said that there are two types of conventionalities: worldly conventionalities and yogic conventionalities.…With regard to illustrations, coarse phenomena of a mistaken perspective that does not investigate or analyze are worldly conventionalities. Subtle impermanence—an object found by a conventional awareness with normal analysis—and the appearances in states subsequent to meditative equipoise of Superiors…are yogic conventionalities.

[9] This incorrect position challenges a shift in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's manner of reading the word "world." When the phrase "of the world" ('jig rten gyi) is added to the phrase "real conventionality" (yang dag pa'i kun rdzob) or "unreal conventionality" (log pa'i kun rdzob), 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa understands [page 213] this to mean conventionalities that are real or unreal for the worldly perspective. (If the qualification "for the worldly perspective" were not added, then one would have to say that all conventionalities are unreal.) However, when the phrase "of the world" ('jig rten gyi) is added to "conventionality" (kun rdzob), 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa does not take this to mean "conventionality in the perspective of the world." Such a reading might suggest a contrasting "conventionality in the perspective of yogis" as advocated by sTag tshang. Or else, it might suggest that worldly conventionalities are phenomena that worldly beings can recognize as conventionalities.

[10] Conventional truths (saṃvṛtisatya), literally, are "truths-for-a-concealing ignorance," phenomena that are misapprehended as truths by the subtlest ignorance—a conception of inherent existence—of even ordinary, healthy persons. A person with jaundice who sees a white piece of paper as yellow may have a coarse ignorant consciousness that believes that the paper is actually yellow, just as it appears. That misconception conceals the white color of the paper. However, such a misconception is not the concealing ignorance in terms of which that paper is a concealer-truth because it is not a conception of inherent existence.

[11] "Blue eye-film" (ling thog sngon po) does not appear in the Sanskrit.

[12] Jacques May's Tibetan (432) reads: 'jig rten kun rdzob bden pa ma yin pas. La Vallée Poussin's Sanskrit (493) reads alokasaṃvṛti.

[13] At 542, reading bshad for shod in accordance with the sGo mang edition, 300a.

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